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Dr. Thomas P. Huf

The purpose of this thesis is constructing a workable
philosophical justification for judicial decision-making
within a liberal political framework.
The thesis begins
wit h an historical evaluation of the law-morals separability
thesis through the natural law and positivist traditions,
then advocates the acceptance of Ronald Dworkin's later
position, with some significant additions.
After showing
the exemplification of the theory advocated here in case
law, the thesis concludes by placing itself within the
liberal political tradition and defending against the criti
cal theorists' tradition and the charge of absolutism and
nihilism.
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INTRODUCTION
T h i s t h e s i s b e g i n s w i t h an e x a m i n a t i o n of ho w the r e l a 
t i o n b e t w e e n w h a t the l a w is and w ha t
been viewed
The

it o u g h t to be has

in the n at u ra l l a w and p o s i t i v i s t tr aditions.

l a w —m o r a l s

s e p a r a b i l i t y th e si s

is o f t e n held p i v o t a l

u n d e r s t a n d i n g the d i f f e r e n c e b e t w e e n these tradi tions.
topic
of

is a l s o an e x c e l l e n t p r e f a c e to the s u b s t a n t i v e

l a w a d d r e s s e d here.

natural

The t h e s i s

first c o n s i d e r s

law t h e o r y of St. T h o m a s Aquinas,

archetype

for all s u b s e q u e n t n a tural

t h e s i s tu r ns to H.L.A.
natural

law.^

D a v i d A.J.

law" t h e o r y of

is next o u t l i n e d as an e x a m p l e of a c o m 

r e j e c t i n g Richards'

p o s i t i o n as u n s a t i s f a c t o r y ,

f o c u s e s on R o n a l d D w o r k i n ' s

" na t ur a li s t"

that D w o r k i n p r o v i d e s

l a w b e s t able to a c c o u n t
d e c i s i o n ma king,

the

H a r t ' s c r i t i c i s m of B l a c k s t o n i a n

law and p o s i t i v i s t positions.

law and maintains

After

work,

b i n a t i o n of na t u r a l

next

issues

is the

law theories.

The " m e t h o d o l o g i c a l n a t u r a l

Richards

Thi s

the

as Th o ma s

a d d r e s s i n g a c o m m o n m i s i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of Thomas'

in

w h i c h d o or s hould an i m a t e

the

the thesis

a p p r o a c h to

the c o n c e p t i o n of

for the true nature of

while remaining

After

judicial

f a i t h f u l to those

law.

ideals

The thesis next

s u g g e s t s an a d d i t i o n to D w o r k i n ' s t h e o r y b a s e d on a p r i n 
c i p l e d m a n n e r of d i s c o u r s e ,
addition
One

the c o n t e n t i o n being

f u r t h e r s t r e n g t h e n s D w o r k i n ' s an alysis.

then c o n c l u d e s w i t h a r et u rn to Th o m a s

that

Chapter

to show h o w
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2
natural law is similar to the position developed here.
Chapter Two then outlines two cases from different
substantive areas of law to exemplify the type of legal
justification advocated here.

Griswold v. Connec ti c ut ,^ the

well-known contraceptive case,

is used as an example of

principled decision making in constitutional law, while
MacPherson v. B u i c k ,^ is the example from tort law.
Chapter Three concludes the thesis by placing the con
ception of judicial decision developed here within the
liberal legal tradition.

After explaining what liberalism

is, the argument here is defended against the critical
theorists, who attack traditional liberalism at its roots.
The thesis then concludes with a defense of the liberal
position developed here against absolutism and nihilism.
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CHAPTER I
"The debate between natural law theory and legal po si
tivism is as ancient as philosophical thought about law and
its fundamental moral purposes.

In general, the debate cen

ters on the answer to the simple question:

Must a law,

in

order to be a law, be morally justified?"4
The natural law tradition generally answers this
question in the affirmative.

A.P. d'Entreaves stated:

"The

close association of morals and law is the distinguishing
mar k of natural law theory thoughout its long history.

The

very enunciation of natural law is a moral p r o p o si t io n ."^
It is instructive to look first at St. Thomas Aquinas
and his definition of eternal law.

In Question 91, Art.

I

of the Summa T h e o l o g i c a , Thomas states:
. . . a law is nothing else but a dictate of
practical reason emanating from the ruler who
governs a perfect community . . . . [t]he whole
community of the universe is governed by Divine
Reason.
Wherefore the very idea of government
of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has
the nature of a law.
And since the Divine
Reason's conception of things is not subject to
time but is eternal . . . therefore it is that
this kind of law must be called eternal.®
Thomas had perhaps the most elaborate metaphysical
development of natural law.

For Thomas, natural law

involved an interpretation of man's nature and his relation
to God.

Natural law was conceived as closely tied to the

eternal Divine order which brought all things into being.
3
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Thomas believed that all things partake of the eternal law
and "from its being imprinted on them, they derive their
respective inclinations to their proper acts and e n d s ."7
Man participates in the Eternal Reason in recognizing the
natural inclination to his proper act and end.

"This p a r 

ticipation of the eternal law in the rational creature is
called the natural law."®

Thus, natural law is man's pa r 

ticipation in eternal law.
The light of natural reason, whereby we discern
wha t is good and what is evil, which is the
function of the natural law, is nothing else
than an imprint on us of the Divine light.
It
is therefore evident that the natural law is
nothing else than the rational creature's par
ticipation of the eternal law.®
Thomas, therefore, does not see natural law as something
totally different from the eternal law, but as "nothing but
a participation thereof.
Thomas is sometimes accused of confusion regarding the
is/ought distinction,

i.e., of not understanding the d i f 

ference between law and morality.
however,
".

d'Entreaves argues,

that the entire history of natural law involved

. . painstaking efforts to delimit the two spheres and to

get to the core of their d i f f e r e n c e .

That Thomas clearly

understood this difference is shown by his analysis of human
law.
"...

from the precepts of the natural law, as from

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

5
general and indemonstrable principles

. . . human reason

needs to proceed to the more particular determinations,
devised by human reason, are called human laws

. . . ."12

In Question 95, Article I, Thomas says that human laws were
necessary to keep depraved people restrained from evil by
use of force and fear, both to leave others in peace and to
eventually become virtuous through practice,
out of choice instead of fear.
man mi ght have peace and virtue,
to be f ra m ed . "11

"Therefore,

i.e., to act
in order that

it was necessary for laws

In Article II, Thomas quotes Augustine

with approval and makes an addition:
just seems to be no law at all'"

"'that which is not

Wherefore the force of a

law depends on the extent of its justice."1^

These Articles

show human law is a human invention created to restrain
wrongdoers.
just law.

The force of a human law depends on its being a
Human law, therefore,

or morality.

is not equated with justice

The fact of a human law does not mean that the

law is, ipso facto,

just.

In Question 96, Thomas addressed the power of human
law.

In Article I, Thomas says the end of law is the common

good and, therefore,

"human laws should be proportionate to

the common g o o d ."1^

The common good,

according to Thomas,

is complex and cannot be determined by a single con
sideration.

"Wherefore laws should take account of many
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things,

as to persons,

as to matters,

and as to times.

Because the c o mm unity of the state is composed of many p e r 
sons;

and its good is proc ured by many a c t i o n s .

law, Thomas maintains,
vidual action.
possible,

is formed for community and not indi

With regard to the degree of certainty

he says that it is wrong to seek the same degree

of certainty in all things.
matters,

Human

"Consequently in contingent

such as natural and human things,

a thing to be certain,
of instances,

it is enough for

as being true in the greater number

though at times and less frequently it

f a i l s . T hu s ,

human law is designed to bring about the

common good, taking m an y considerations into account,
will sometimes,

and

perhaps even often, be mistaken.

In Question 91, A r t . II, Thomas discusses whether it is
p r o p e r for human law to "repress all vices."

Men differ

g re a t l y in their degree of "virtue" and human law is framed
for a wide variety of humans.
forbid all vices,

Therefore,

"human laws do not

from which the virtuous abstain,

the more grevious vices

but only

. . . chiefly those that are to the

hurt of others, w it h ou t the pr oh ibition of which human
society could not be maintained:
murder,
bel ief

theft and such l i k e .

thus human law prohibits
Thus Thomas

shows his

in the diffe r en c e between human law and morality and

his conce ption of the limited role of law in acting out the
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mo ral life.
Human law, for Thomas,
law and eternal law:
us

also di ffers from both natural

"The natural law is a participation in

of the eternal law: While human law

eternal

l a w . H u m a n

tion in Thomas'

law,

falls short of the

it is seen, has a limited func

p h il o so p hy of law.

N ow Augustine says (de Lib. A n b . i5):
"The law
w h i c h is formed for the government of states,
allows and leaves unpunished man y things that
are punished by Divine providence.
Nor, if this
la w does not attempt
to do everything, is this a
reason why it should
be blamed for what it does.
Wherefore, too, human law does not prohibit
ev erything that is forbidden by the natural
l a w . 20
In Question 96, Art.

4, Thomas addressed the question

of whether human law binds a

man in conscience.

tes that laws are either just or unjust and,
one in conscience,

Thomas

if just, bind

with the power of the eternal law.

laws are "legal l a w s ."21
into two categories:

m ig h t be burdensome,

Such

Thomas then divides unjust laws

those opposed to human good,

opposed to Divine good.

sta

and those

Those laws opposed to human good

against the common good, might go

beyo nd a law g iver's p o w e r , might impose unequal burdens,
etc.

"The like are acts of violence rather than laws;

b ec a us e Augustine says
not just,

(De Lib. Arb.

seems to be no law at all.'

do not bind in conscience,

i.5),

'a law that is

Wherefore such laws

except perhaps

in order to avoid
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scandal or disturbance

. . . ."22

Thomas uses idolatry as

an example of a law opposed to the Divine good.
this kind must nowise be observed, because,
Acts V.29,

"Laws of

as stated in

'we ought to obey God rather than

m e n .

'"23

That Thomas saw human law as very distinct from m o r a 
lity is shown by his statements regarding enforcement of
u njust laws:

"The power that man holds from God does not

e xtend to this:

wh erefore neither in such matters

is man

bound to obey the law, provided he avoid giving scandal or
inflicting a more grievous

h u r t . " 2 4

Thomas was careful to

sh ow that what i^ the law is not necessarily what ought to
be the law.

A law opposed to human good, an unjust law,

"an act of violence," and is not law.

is

The only reasons

w hich Thomas gives for obeying an unjust law are avoidance
of scandal or causing a greater hurt through disobeyance.
The second kind of unjust laws, those against the Divine
good,

should never be obeyed, as they are directly opposed

to the laws of God and,

for Thomas, would involve peril of

o n e 's s o u l .
The Scholastic natural law tradition,
e xempli f ie d by Thomas,

therefore,

as

had a clear grasp of the difference

b etween "legal conformity and the moral value of a c t i o n " 25
and foreshadowed a disti nc t io n betw een the moral and legal
spheres.

While Thomas and the Schoolmen may have unduly

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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stressed the moral aspect of law or the legal aspect of
morals,

they were well aware that there were differences

between

t h e m .

26

H.L.A. Hart,

in his well known article "Positivism and

the Separation of Law and M o r a l s , "27 makes a compelling case
for the positivist insistence on the separation of law and
morals.

Bentham and Austin,

Hart begins, constantly

insisted on the need to distinguish law as it is from law as
it ought to be.

The Utilitarian movement stood for all the

principles of liberalism in law and government,
liberty of speech and press,

such as

the right of association,

the

need to make laws widely known and published before they
were enforced, and the principle of no criminal liability
w it hout

f a u l t .

28

Hart cautions against taking the simpli

city of the Utilitarians for superficiality and uses Bentham
on slavery as an example.

Bentham said the issue was not

one of whether slaves can reason, but simply whether they
s u f f e r . 29

Once it is acknowledged that the Utilitarians

work ed for a better society and better laws, then it is
possible to turn to the separation of law and morals they
advocated in the proper light.
Austin believed God's commands were fundamental pr i n
ciples of morality, with ut ility as an index.

Bentham

insisted on the distinction between law as it is and ought

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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to be, though for him the distinction was based solely on
the principle of utility and not on belief in God.

Austin

and Bentham formulated the separation doctrine as an answer
to Blackstone's position, which they found confused and
misleading.

They interpreted BlacJcstone as saying that a

human law which conflicts with Divine law is simply not a
law.

Thus, Blackstone, according to their criticism,

acknowledged no separation of law and morals.
Hart argues that it was their intention to enable
people to see the issues brought out by the existence of
morally bad laws and to understand the authority of a legal
order.Bentham,

in particular, thought that two errors,

both in Blackstone, were created by the failure to separate
law and morals.

The first error consists in someone saying

"This ought not to be law, therefore it is not and I can
disregard it."
anarchy,

The peril of this approach he saw as

i.e., that law and its authority are negated by a

person's conceptions of what the law ought to be.
second error, even more evident in Blackstone,

The

is to say

"This is the law, therefore it is what it ought to be."

The

danger here is a very conservative view, permitting existing
law to replace morality as the final test of conduct and so
escape criticism.31
Thus the positivists saw the distinction between law
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and morals as a way of assuring the criticism of the law.
They saw themselves as reacting against two negative impli
cations of Blackstone's

work, namely

the tendency toward

anarchy on one hand and

conservatism

on the other.

Later in his article. Hart turns to a discussion of the
argument that positivism aided the horrors of the Nazi
regime by advocating subservience to "mere law" and the
failure of the German legal system to protest against the
wrongs

they were required to act out in the name of law.

argues

that this post war insistence on joining law and

morals

overlooks precisely the point Bentham and Austin were

making

about the separation required to enable criticism of

morally evil laws.

He

Hart argues persuasively that it is an

enormous overvaluation of the bare fact that a rule of law
is valid to think that this is conclusive as to the question
of whether this law should be obeyed.

"Surely the truly

liberal answer to any sinister use of the slogan 'law is
law' or of the distinction between law and morals is,
well, but that does not

conclude the question.

morality; Do not let it

supplant morality.'"32

Law

'Very

is not

Hart thus relies on the purpose of the positivist
distinction between law and morals to show that it is a fun
damental misunderstanding of positivism to blame it for
aiding the rise of the Nazis to power.

Hart does not
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dispute, however, that such misunderstanding may have some
how provided support for the rise of totalitarianism.
Hart next turns to an evaluation of a trial of a war
criminal after the war.

The example he uses is a woman who

wished to be rid of her husband and turned him in to the
authorities for insulting remarks he made about Hitler while
home on leave from the German

a r m y .

33

The husband was

arrested and sentenced to death, though he was actually sent
to the front.

A court of appeals found her guilty of pro

curing the deprivation of her husband's liberty, even though
he was sentenced by a court for violating a statute, since
the statute "was contrary to the sound conscience and sense
of justice of all decent human beings."34

Though this was

hailed as a triumph of natural law. Hart thinks it an unwise
decision.

He advocates the introduction of a law, which the

State would admit to be retrospective, as the lesser of two
evils;

leaving her unpunished or enacting retrospective

criminal legislation.

Although both the natural law and

positivist approaches lead to the same result (punishing the
woman). Hart sees the vice of the Blackstone natural law
approach as a lack of candor and a romantic optimism which
conceals the difficult nature of the moral choice involved.
To say, with the Blackstone natural law interpretation, that
the Law of the Reich was not law is certainly philosophi
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cally confusing and not accepted by most people.
not law?

How is it

The Utilitarian approach has the benefit of

clarity by holding that "laws may be law, but too evil to be
o be y ed . "35
suasive.

Hart's argument is well-reasoned and per
He squarely faces the tough issue of the necessity

of making an undesirable moral choice with clarity, versus
an interpretation which introduces more problems than it
solves.
A. persuasive point in Hart's analysis is his argument
that the distinction between law as it is and ought to be
need not involve adopting a subjectivistic, relativistic or
noncognitive stand on moral values and judgments.

First,

the Utilitarians themselves did not accept a subjectivistic
view.

Hart argues that the positivist distinction has been

confused with noncognitivism.

A noncognitive moral theory

holds that statements of fact (what ^

the case) belong to a

radically different category than value statements
ought to be the c a s e ) .

(what

Basically, statements of what

are

statements of fact and can be argued for in a rational way,
while statements of value are non-cognitive and cannot be
argued for rationally like statements of fact.

We must add

a non-cognitive statement to a statement of fact to equal an
" o u g h t .

"36

This is subjectivistic or relativistic because

moral judgments are not rationally discoverable or deba-
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table.

"They are 'fiats of the will,' expressions of

'emotions,'

'preferences'

or 'attitu des.'"37

Opposed to this view is the belief that is/ought,
fact/value distinctions are wrong.

This entails. Hart says,

the belief that moral values are imposed on us by the
character of our world and are not just emotion,
attitudes, etc.

feelings,

Moral argument is not therefore reduced to

shouting commands or expressing feelings or emotions, but
involves a process whereby the parties acknowledge after
examination and reflection "that an initially disputed case
falls within the ambit of a vaguely apprehended principle,"
as cognitive or rational as any other disputed classifica
tion of particulars.38
If the second view were accepted, this would not change
the function of the distinction between the law as it is and
ought to be.

Morally bad laws would still be laws and

demonstrating something morally desirable would not make it
law.

Therefore, Hart argues, whether one accepts a subjec

tivist view of the nature of moral judgment or accepts the
view that values are imposed by the character of the world
makes little difference.

This can be true in a narrow sense

for the distinction between the law as it is and ought to
be, but the difference is important in a broader sense, as
will be brought out later in this thesis.

Consider now an
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attempted further development of the positivist's position
by David A.J. Richards.
David A.J. Richards in "Rules, Policies, and Neutral
Principles;

The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and

Constitutional Adjudication^"39 gives a general defense of
Hart's positivist theory.

He makes an exception, however,

for constitutional law, which he acknowledges may be better
explained by a quasi natural law theory of legal reasoning.
Richards begins by saying natural law has insisted on a
conceptual link between law and morals and positivism has
insisted on their conceptual separability.

He states that

legal positivism's insistence on the law-morals separability
thesis is the sounder position.

Richards notes that the

separability thesis is different from the idea of some legal
positivists,

notably Hans Kelsen, that the legal system can

not logically be the subject of moral criticism.

Richards

thinks Ke l se n 's position is false and mentions Be ntham's
insistence that the separation of law and morals would facilitate criticism.

Richards also distinguishes the separabi

lity thesis from the institutional claim of some positivists
that a judge cannot invoke moral standards as extra-legal
norms unless those moral standards play a role in the legal
system,

i.e., unless the judge is "invited" to develop moral

standards.'**^

One can accept the separability thesis.
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Richards argues, and reject this institutional claim.

A

judge could appeal to extralegal standards "as part of the
judicial function of doing justice" or "the moral duties of
a judge" may require an appeal to extralegal standards.41
All Richards means is that judges can appeal outside the
moral norms of the institution.

However, he does not here

provide any justification for such an appeal, nor is he able
to within the positivist conception.
Richards then makes an argument for what he calls
"methodological natural law,"^2 based on the empirical
observation of a substantial interconnection between legal
and moral concepts in many concrete legal institutions.
Methodological natural law is a tool for examining the moral
conceptions that underlie our institutions.
it a natural law theory because:

Richards calls

(1) the focus is on the

moral dimension of laws, unlike legal positivism which tries
to characterize only the pure legal element in law; and (2)
the moral principles, on which the theoretical account may
rest, are objective principles of moral reasonableness,
similar to those which natural law theory traditionally used
to assess legal s ys t em s .
In The Moral Criticism of L a w , R i c h a r d s

expands his

view by saying the purposes of methodological natural law
theory are both descriptive and critical.

By descriptive
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Richards means that the meaning and purposes of moral ideas
present in legal institutions will be brought out.

The

second aspect is that "the moral analysis will provide a
critical moral point of view form which legal doctrines may
be assessed and appropriate reforms

s u g g e s t e d

Richards concludes the article by saying that it is
proper to focus on areas where law and morals systematically
interconnect, especially constitutional law, to show the
working out of his theory.
maintains,

When one does this, Richards

it is clear that methodological natural law gets

at a truth in the natural law conception, without actually
being a natural law p o s i t i o n . I t

does this by permitting

the law to draw upon morals when, but only when, the law
does interconnect with morality.

Richards uses the First

Amendment as an example of this interconnection of law and
morality.
Richards claims his position shares a fundamental
kinship with positivism because:
both approaches is the same:

"At bottom, the concern of

how may the philosophical arts

of critical se 1f-coneiousness clarify and guide the
enlightened moral criticism of law?"^7
Richards'

The problem with

position is that, while he is right that the moral

criticism of law is the purpose of both positivism and
natural law theory, one must adopt a moral foundational ism
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for such moral criticism to be effective.

Adopting such a

position will inevitably lead Richards to cross over into a
real natural law position.
To restate, Richards is correct to focus on "the moral
analysis of concrete legal institutions and issues,"48 but
it is philosophically unsatisfying to use moral principles
as if they were universal natural law principles which
everyone accepted and not state the basis or foundation for
using such principles.

Richards tries to avoid these dif

ficulties with natural law by interjecting specific moral
conceptions to be used for moral analysis and criticism.

He

then acts as if the moral theory were there, first to be
found in, for example, the First Amendment, and secondly
that this moral conception, once found, could then be used
to criticize the implementation or acting out of such a
p r i n c p l e .^9

An obvious and serious danger in this approach

is exposed when we recognize that talk about "the central
moral value of the First Amendment,"^® as if this value were
clearly one thing as opposed to a nother, does not
acknowledge that one brings a moral conception of the world
to bear in this evaluation.
In su mmary, it seems that Richards is attempting to
claim a value neutrality by acting as if the values being
used were implicit in past judicial tradition and practice
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and that this presence,

in and of itself,

is enough to com

pel us to continue to apply these principles.
just plain mistaken.

This seems

Even if we could identify the moral

values behind specific constitutional provisions, and this
is granting a lot, we will still need to determine whether
these values were worth preserving and fostering.
Constitutional adjudication is not a mechanical act and
should not be treated like one.

Let us turn now to Ronald

Dworkin for an analysis of the problems with Richards'

posi

tion .
Dworkin's reply to Richards is in Taking Rights
Seriously^^

and a more recent paper where he further deve

lops his "naturalist" position.

Dworkin begins by saying

that Richards agrees that principles play an important role
in determining what the law is on some matter, but Richards
believes that traditional legal positivism "which insists
that what the law is is just a matter of fact, is neverthe
less

s o u n d .

"52

Positivism, Richards argues, can admit the

role of principles of law because the question of what role
these principles play in the legal system is a question of
fact and how the principles are applied in each case is "a
matter of ordinary professional
Richards'

j u d g m e n t .

”53

Dworkin quotes

argument as follows:

Legal principles are, after all, legal; in order
to be binding, they must be implicit in past
judicial tradition and practice, inferable by
the usual methods of legal reasoning by
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analogy . . . .
Legal principles, like legal
rules, depend at bottom on an issue of fact,
that is, the critical attitudes of j u d g e s . ^4
Dworkin disagrees, first, that the identification of
legal ideas is simply a matter of ordinary fact.

Most prin

ciples judges cite are controversial, at least as to w e ig h t,
and "many appeals to principle are appeals to principles
which have not been the subject of any established judicial
practice at a l l ."55

Dworkin states that one can make per

suasive arguments to adopt one theory of law as superior to
another when theories conflict-

These arguments, however,

must go beyond the limits which a positivist conception is
ready to accept as proper,

in that they must taken into

account arguments from normative political theory.

Indeed,

Dworkin claims that a person's theory of law will include
almost all the political and moral principles to which he
subscribes, so these will all play a role in the justifica
tion of the legal

s y s t e m .

56

By "implicit" Richards does not mean, Dworkin argues,
that there must be a tradition of actually citing these
princples or that these principles follow deductively from
precedents,

since these are both clearly false.

The prac

tice of justification does not always use principles pre
viously cited and deductive logic plays little or no role in
judicial decision

m a k i n g .

57

Dworkin concludes that he does
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not actually know the way that Richards means that princples
must be implicit in past judicial tradition and practice,
but suggests Richards may be adopting a view similar to that
of Rolf Sartorius, who holds that one purported theory of
explanation will always provide a better fit with the data
of a particular case based on "canons of explanation used in
the sciences, and judges do and should choose that
theory.Dworkin

admits that he used to hold a view very

similar to this, but came to reject it.

He then states a

central element of his concern with the sort of position
Richards and the positivists advance:
I do not think that there are agreed criteria of
superior theoretical explanation even in the
case of scientific explanation, and experience
shows that in the case of law one account is
often preferred to another on reasons that can
not realistically be understood as reducible to
the relative number of earlier decisions
explained, or the simplicity or elegance of the
explanation . . . .
If judges did decide cases
by citing canons of theory construction,
counting the number of precedents explained by
competing hypotheses, and contrasting the
theoretical elegance of these hypotheses, we
might at last have a genuine example of
"mechanical" decision making . . . supposed to
be derogatory in law, though not . . . in other
fields where a moral dimension is lacking, like
c;Q
enginee r in g .
Sar t orius' position, then, is self-deceptive, as it
would have us believe that judges were just "following
procedures," as it were,

instead of making moral choices.

Dworkin's position here has an existential dimension in
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that,

in Sartre's words, Sartorius is choosing not to

choose.

That is, he is acting as if the morality of the

particular person did not play a role and that the judge is
just a sort of neutral instrument through which the various
factors are funneled.

The danger here is the loss of a

moral dimension through a kind of self-delusion.

Whenever

the moral dimension is lost, the real risk is that of a
wasted life, of leading a life which is not "well lived," as
Socrates meant this, where one lives in a moral vacuum.
Richards insists the princples implicit in past tradi
tions and practices must be a matter of fact in order to
resist the view that law is always morally sound and the
counterpart, that morally evil laws are not laws, i.e., the
traditional positivist distinction between what the law is
and ought to be.
alternatives:

Richards, Dworkin asserts, sees only two

(1) the positivist claim that it is always a

question of fact that the law is; or (2) the extreme natural
law position, which maintains that there can be no dif
ference between princples of law and principles of morality.
Dworkin rightly rejects this false dichotomy.
What the law requires may depend on "what background
morality r e q u i r e s , s o
fact.

it is not merely a question of

Dworkin uses as examples:

instances where the

legislature puts moral tests into legal rules; cases where
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the legislature says nothing about its intent; when specific
legal principles embodying moral concepts are decisive of a
legal issue; and when the question at issue is what
princples are decisive.

However, from the position that

morality is rightly considered part of the law, it does not
follow "either that the law is always morally right, or that
what is morally right is always the law, even in hard
c a s e s ."61
Dworkin does adopt the position that legal principles
are always moral principles in f o rm , though they need not
always be sound or correct moral principles.

By moral,

Dworkin means that the princples in legal arguments "make
claims about the rights and duties of citizens and other
legal people rather than stating, for example, prudential
judgments or historical generalizations."62

Thus, Dworkin

recognizes and acknowledges the human element of making a
"claim" and of then providing the best possible justifica
tion for that claim, consistent with the background and
institutional history of the area.
In summary, Dworkin accepts the law-morals separability
thesis,

in that he believes the law is not always moral and

morality is not always law.

Dworkin does believe, however,

that legal princples are always moral principles in that
they invoke a statement of value about that principle.
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These claims would be provided with a foundation by the
political morality of the judge, all things considered, con
sistent with the history and tradition of the right which
went before.

This leads me to Dworkin's later, more deve

loped presentation of these issues.
Dworkin gives a more detailed version of his natural
law position in a recent article,
R e v i sited.

"'Natural' Law

He begins by saying that any theory which

makes the content of law sometimes depend on the answer to
some moral question is a natural law theory.

Dworkin

acknowledges he is a natural law theorist in this sense and
then defends this position, which he calls "naturalism."
Naturalism holds that judges should decide hard cases in the
following way:

"by trying to find the best justification

they can find, in principles of political morality, for the
structure as a whole, from the most profound constitutional
rules and arrangements to the details of, for example, the
private law of tort or co ntract."64

This is a principled

approach, since any attempted justification will have to
address the question of the best justification and must also
state these princples as precisely as possible.

Dworkin's

judge, working within this system, is able to provide only a
partial justification— as opposed to the full justification
of Hercules in the "Hard Cases" section— since he is only
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human.

This description of partial justification is impor

tant, however, because it helps define the consistency
required of a judge.

"A judge should regard the law he

mines and studies as embedded in a much larger system."^5
It is always relevant, therefore, for the judge to look
further and ask whether his judgments are consistent with
the whole system of law.

This is a natural law theory,

since each judge's decision about what past law requires
will be tempered by his own political morality, i.e., the
best political justification of that law.
Dworkin gives an example of what he calls extending a
discipline into the future by examining its past in an ana
logy to the literary process.

Imagine being handed the

first few chapters of A Christmas Carol and being told to
add a chapter to the novel, with the directions to make the
best novel possible.

When done,

it is sent to another per

son with the same directions, etc.

The writer will be faced

with a sense of interpretation which Dworkin thinks is ana
logous to the naturalist judge.

In making this the best

possible novel, one must be respectful to what is already
there in the text, i.e., one must not follow an interpreta
tion ruled out by the text.
Dworkin then supposes two possible interpretations of
Scrooge.

The first is that he is inherently wicked, an
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example of

the degradation

of which human nature is capable.

The second

is Scrooge as inherently good, but progressively

corrupted by false values and the perverse demands of high
Capitalist Society.^6

The interpretation adopted will make

an enormous difference how the work continues.

The aim is

to create the best novel one can, while still making it a
single work of art, i.e., to respect the text and not
interpret the character in a way which it rules out.

If the

text is blatantly inconsistent with one interpretation, this
alternative is ruled out.
with both,

one can choose.

If the text is equally consistent
You will then choose the one,

Dworkin says, that makes the work more significant or other
wise better, depending on your own experience with people
like Scrooge.

Dworkin then raises the crucial question—

what if you believe one interpretation i_s better than the
other, you agree with it, think it is a more profound
insight into human nature, etc., but this will be incon
sistent with more things in the text, i.e., more things will
be regarded as mistakes under this interpretation?

You must

then ask which interpretation makes the work better on the
whole--it is not simply a mechanical matter of choosing the
interpretation which brings out fewer "mistakes," since the
less favored interpretation may well be a less revealing
picture of human nature.67,68
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Dworkin thus believes that a judge should decide new
cases in the spirit of a novelist in a chain writing a fresh
chapter.

One does not have a clean slate, but is required

to go on as before.

"The best interpretation of past judi

cial decisions is the interpretation that shows these in the
best light . . . politically, as coming as close to the
correct ideals of a just legal system as possible."69
Dworkin is concerned with the possibility of subjec
tivism, of letting the judge's personal evaluation be the
sole criterion for decision.

But Naturalism, as he con

ceives it, only allows a limited use of a judge's beliefs of
what political and personal rights people have "naturally,"
i.e., apart form the law.
history"^®

The "brute facts of legal

will limit discretion and assure that the judges

beliefs are not the only test of law.

If the judge uses too

much discretion, there will be too little integration, too
much legal history will have to be viewed as accidental.

An

Agatha Christie mystery can't be made into a philosophical
exploration of death,

for example, even if the latter were a

more desirable enterprise.
The judge has an obligation to continue the past, not
invent a better one.

Showing history as incoherent or an

unprincipled chaos does not provide the best possible justi
fication for a legal decision.

This does not rule out.
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however, a dramatic reinterpretation, such as the one given
negligence law in MacPerhson v . Buick by Justice Cardozo,
which unifies what went before and shows prior decisions in
a clearer light.
Though judges can have different conceptions of what
counts as a fit, the essential thing is to address these
questions in a principled way.
naturalism demands.
"working style of

This, indeed, is what

Dworkin is concerned to give us a

i n t e r p r e t a t i o n , "

cannot be mechanical.

^2 because interpretation

One must have principles as guides,

but there is a distinction between fit and substantive
justice.

Detailing of the requirements of substantive

justice is impossible and deceptive.

Dworkin requires

judges to reflect "on the full set of the substantive and
procedural political rights of citizens a just legal system
must respect and serve.
The rest of Dworkin*s article is interesting and per
suasive, but can be given short summary for purposes of the
discussion here.

Dworkin looks at various challenges to

naturalism and essentially deals quite effectively with
them.

He rejects subjectivism by rejecting the

"demonstrability thesis."

He argues naturalism is not

undemocratic because democracy requires the law be as prin
cipled and coherent as possible.

Naturalism also best
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respects the right of each person to be treated by his
government as an equal, a right crucial to

d e m o c r a c y .

Against the instrumentalist claim that naturalism is "crazy"
for being tied to the past, Dworkin argues "it is unfair to
reach a decision which offends the best interpretation of
the p a s t . H e

states in clear and powerful terms that

naturalism best brings out issues of political morality
which need to be addressed, using the example of slavery.
Does a slaveholder have the right to enforcement of the
constitutional system on his behalf, e.g., to keep his sla
ves imprisoned at home?

A naturalist judge might think he

does not because no one can have a right to the equal bene
fit of wicked laws.

"In that case you would decide against

the slaveowners if you could, because the underlying reason
for your concern with the past, which is people's abstract
rights to institutional consistency, would have exhausted
..
, _ „77
Dworkin seems to say that when the abstract
Its p o w e r . ''
rights run out, one is then left to rely on the best
possible justification, which would take into account the
right to a public order which treats all people as equals.
Finally, Dworkin concludes this section by stating it does
not matter if one uses naturalist, traditional natural law
or positivist terminology in not upholding the rights of
slaveholders.

"For the important issue is not what you say,

but what you d o . I

take this as consistent with
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R ic hards’ position that the purpose of both natural law and
positivism is to be able to criticize the law.

In spite of

their differences, both Dworkin and Richards share this fun
damental insight.
Dworkin concludes the article by addressing the two
ideals of our political system.

One is an external ideal,

that of a perfectly just and effective system.

This is a

challenge to legislation, political will and the community's
sense of justice.

The second ideal is internal, that of

itself made pure.

This is the challenge to adjudication, to

make the standards which govern our lives articulate,
coherent and effective.

People will disagree about which of

these ideals should have precedence, but this is inevitable
whenever a community recognizes people "have rights beyond
the strict and narrow limits within which everyone agrees
what these rights a r e ."79

Naturalism seems the best method

for providing principled justification, even if it will
sometimes create controversy and small confusions, because
"naturalism at least takes the actual political order, pro
perly interpreted, as the common standard, so that citizens
are encouraged to put to themselves the same questions that
officials who adjudicate their disputes will ask in judging
them."80

Dworkin believes we should strive for these

ideals and says the courts play an indispensable part in our
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actions— the courts are the forum for the internal ideal of
making the standards which govern our lives articulate,
coherent and effective.
Dworkin's position is compelling for several reasons.
First,

it allows for the bringing in of "values."

"Values"

is, of course, an all inclusive word, i.e., it can be used
by subjectivists or absolutists.

"Value" is used here in

the sense of a principle that can be raised and debated in a
principled manner.

For example, one can say that people

have a right to equal respect and concern or have a right to
be treated as ends in themselves and not as means to some
end.

One would then point to situations where this right is

not respected, e.g., slavery or sexual abuse, and point to
the results.

The results might be very low conception of

self worth, wide-spread pain and suffering, guilt on the
oppressor's part, e t c .

Using this method, one points to the

things one is speaking on behalf of, testifies on their
behalf and then appeals to the common experience of the
listener.

Some of the best examples of this method of

discourse come from the New Testament.

For example, when

Jesus is approached by the rich man in Matthew 19:16-22, he
is asked what must be done to have eternal life.

Jesus

gives him a list of six commandments, what the law requires.
When the rich man answers that he follows all these and asks
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what he still lacks, Jesus tells him to sell all he has and
give the money to the poor and follow him,

"But when the

young man heard that he went away sorrowful:
great possessions."81

for he had

This passage is very instructive.

Jesus appealed first to the law and secondly to a principle
not in the law.

He answered the young m a n ’s questions in a

principled way, even if the advice was very difficult to
follow.

I quoted the last verse of their encounter because

it shows that it is always a possibility with this method of
argument that the listener will not be convinced.

One can

testify to one's own experience, point to the sources of the
experience, appeal to commonality and the listener may still
not be convinced— he can still walk away.

Dworkin’s expla

nation allows for this sort of experience because the poli
tical morality of a judge, all things considered, is used in
reaching a justification for particular decisions.

This

allows for dialogue and a principled approach to these
issues of value, using the method of testimony and appeal.
One also needs to reject, as Dworkin argues, the
demonstrability thesis in moral matters.

It is perhaps

enough to say that the thesis itself is undemonstreble and
therefore fails under its own criteria.

In summary, the use

of "values" is essential in legal justification, and
Dworkin's position provides a principled approach which
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argues for these values, while clearly acknowledging they
are not absolute.
Dworkin's method, combined with that of testimony and
appeal, brings value decisions out front, that is, it does
not hide behind a belief that the values are somehow
nuetrally in the system calling only for the use of
"prudential judgment" in their application, a la Richards.
Richards*

position is mistaken, though it is a common con

ception of the way legal decisions are made.
being misleading,

In addition to

it can be a dangerous position because it

does not acknowledge the personal involvement of the deci
sion maker.

It can lead to an amoral, mechanical view of

the law, which is simply contrary to the reality of the
involvement of the decision maker.
Kierkegaard emphasized this existential aspect of life
against Hegel's "pure thought."

Kierkegaard's criticism of

the tendency toward abstraction is applicable to Richards'
theory of judicial decision making.
youth of philosophy generally,

"In Greece, as in the

it was found difficult to win

through to the abstract and to leave existence, which always
gives the particular;

in modern times, on the other hand,

has become difficult to reach existence.

The process of

abstraction is easy enough for us, but we also desert
existence more and m o r e , and the realm of pure thought is
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the extreme limit of such desertion.

In Greece, philo

sophizing was a mode of action, and the philosopher was
therefore an existing

i n d i v i d u a l .

"83

Dworkin's approach is

more honest in acknowledging legal reasoning as a "mode of
action" and the judge as an "existing" individual confronted
with difficult moral decisions.
Finally, the naturalist/testimony and appeal position
is better able to give an account of the force behind the
law.

It is better able to speak up on behalf of those

things which give life to the law, which brought the law
into being.

It seems to belittle rights to say that we

ultimately have them only because they ware written into the
U.S. Constitution or they are part of our legal inheritance,
etc.

When one thinks of the freedoms of speech, religion

and press or the equal protection clause, one does not think
of a document, a lifeless piece of paper.
It is essential to address the things which gave rise
to the document, the force behind our still accepting it, if
we are to have a faithful application of these rights in the
future.

This might mean looking at the conditions existing

in England at the time of the American Revolution.

A look

at the abuses of the English system will indicate why the
Framers insisted on rights having force against the state.
It would also mean giving examples where people were not
treated with equal respect and concern and making appeals to
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the commonality of the listeners.

This approach would rely

on the Constitutional provisions, explicit and implicit,
would recognize that a court can get around, or indeed throw
out, provisions when the life has gone out of them, when
they cease to be living ideas.

Keeping this force alive

means being faithful both to the history and tradition of
the Constitution and to the things themselves,

i.e., that

which gave power to the ideas which gave rise to the
Constitution.

This is the idea of values coming from the

world which Hart made reference to in claiming that a sub
jectivist position did not make a difference in the applica
tion of the law-morals separability thesis.

In his limited

context, I agree, but when one looks at the broader context
of the law as only alive because of the force behind it, I
think one's philosophy becomes vitally important and subjectivisim is an unacceptable alternative.
It is important to note a vital similarity in St.
Thomas' work and the position this thesis develops.

If one

leaves out Thomas' metaphysics, natural law can mean
something like testimony and appeal.

While a Thomist might

argue that natural law is based on the word of God as
reflected in man's reason, this thesis argues for an
acknowledgement of the forces which animate the law and for
testimony on their behalf.

Though there are serious and
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important differences between the positions/ they share a
fundamental insight in that they both see judicial decision
making as a process informed by extra-legal concerns.

They

both require fidelity to those extra-legal concerns, thereby
avoiding an anchorless, subjective stand.

They both view

the law as more than "fiats of the will" and exercises of
raw power.

They share a fundamental concern with the

correct application of law, i.e., that the law be properly
administered in individual cases.

Finally, they share a

commonality of purpose in being true to the "things
themselves."

If, that is, law is a reflection of reality

"out there," however dimly or vaguely it is perceived, one
must at all times strive to give a true interpretation of
these things.

Thus, even though a naturalist/principled

analysis would not meet the metaphysical standard of proof
which a traditional natural law theorist might require,
Thomas' position is critically similar in its faithfulness
to principle and those things which animate the principles.
In summary of this chapter, the law-morals separability
thesis can and should be accepted.

Traditional natural law,

as exemplified in Thomas, has not denied this distinction.
Dworkin,

is right, however, that legal principles are moral

statements in form, in that they make claims about rights
and values,

i.e., they require a "claimer."

One must be
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careful not to fall into subjectivism and the method of
testimony and appeal, with the support of the Constitutional
materials, avoids this.

Therefore, the law-morals separabi

lity thesis need not lead to an abandonment of a naturalist
position.

Indeed, it seems that any legal position becomes

incoherent without adopting such a naturalist foundation.
The naturalist model Dworkin proposes provides a good
starting framework for a theory of law which can be most
faithful to those things which sustain us.

There is, of

course, no certainty that a judge working in such a manner
will be a better judge.

He could be demented, create deci

sions most people disagree with, or simply abuse his power.
However, this is always true of a judge, even a traditional
positivist.

Naturalism at least has the benefit of putting

the decisions out front, "so that citizens are encouraged to
put to themselves the same questions that officials who
adjudicate their disputes will ask in judging them."84

it

is perhaps true that one cannot ask more of any legal
system.
At this point in the thesis it is important to
demonstrate just how the position advocated here works in
practice.

It is the purpose of the next chapter to show

this practical application, through the use of case law.
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CHAPTER II
It is important that one actually show the working out
of a legal theory in concrete terms, i.e., in case law.

The

areas of constitutional law and tort both offer excellent
examples of the application and use of a broad
naturalist/principled discourse approach to judicial
decision-making.
Griswold

V.

The right of privacy, specifically

Connecticut, is a good example of the working

out of constitutional law theory, while product liability
law, specifically MacPherson v. B uick, shows how naturalist
principles operate in the tort area.

Griswold will be exa

mined first, as constitutional law is a clearer example of
the working out of principle in the law since constitutional
law is generally based on principle, unlike the common law
(case law) tradition inherited from England.

The MacPherson

case will then be analyzed as an example from the common law
tradition.
The first case addressed to show the working out of a
broad naturalist/principled legal analysis is Griswold v.
Connecticut.

Griswold involves the constitutionality of two

Connecticut state statutes.

The first statute made it a

crime for any person to use any drug or article to prevent
conception.

The second statute prohibited any person from

giving information, medical advice or counseling regarding
38

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

39
the use of contraceptives.

Appellant Griswold was Executive

Director of the Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut.
Dr. Buxton, a licensed physician and Medical Director for
the Planned Parenthood League, is also an appellant in this
case, as he prescribed the contraceptive devices to the
couple involved in this case.

The lower court found both

appellants guilty as accessaries and fined them $100 each.
The couple who sought contraceptives through Planned
Parenthood were married.

The Court allowed the appellants

standing to raise the constitutional rights of the married
couple and quickly turned to the merits of the case.
Justice Douglas, writing the majority opinion, begins
with the statement that the court is not a "super
legislature" which evaluates the worth of economic, business
or social laws.

The Connecticut law, however, is different,

as it involves the intimate relations of a husband and wife.
J. Douglas then turns to the First Amendment and lists
numerous ways in which "the State may not . . .
the spectrum of available knowledge."®^

contract

He lists several

instances where the Court has protected "peripheral rights"
in order to secure specific rights.

He then states;

"specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras,
formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give
them life and substance."®®

These guarantees, J. Douglas
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maintains, create "zones of privacy."

Though Justice

Douglas places a strong emphasis on the right of privacy as
found in the First, Fourth and Fifth Amendments, he also
mentions the Third and Ninth Amendments as creating such
zones of privacy.
The Connecticut statutes, Douglas argues, impinge on
the marriage relationship, which is "within the zone of pri
vacy created by several fundamental constitutional
guarantees."®”^

Douglas strikes the statutes down as unnec

essarily broad and invading the areas of protected freedoms.
Enforcement, Douglas contends, would involve searching a
married couple's bedroom, an idea which "is repulsive to the
notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship."®®
It is a generous evaluation of Douglas' opinion to say
it is unclear.
decision turns.

It is frankly baffling exactly on what the
He mentions six amendments and does not

explicitly say which amendment or argument is determinative.
The "penumbras, formed by emanations" language is often
attacked as oracular in nature or even nonsensical.

At one

point Justice Douglas cites six cases as precedent and says
"These cases bear witness that the right of privacy which
presses for recognition here is a legitimate o n e ."89

The

key to this opinion, it _is clear, is his belief that the
marriage relationship lies within the zone of privacy
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created by several fundamental constitutional rights.
Though there is not much substance to Douglas' opinion, or
what is substantive is at least confusing, he does write
well, particularly in the last paragraph of the opinion:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the
Bill of Rights— older than our political par
ties, older than our school system.
Marriage is
a coming together for better or for worse, hope
fully enduring, and intimate to the degree of
being sacred.
It is an association that pro
motes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral
loyalty, not commercial or social projects.
Yet
it is an association for as noble a purpose as
any involved in our prior decisions.
The first concurring opinion was written by Justice
Arthur Goldberg,

joined by Chief Justice Earl Warren and

Justice William Brennan.

It is a long and complex opinion,

but important to this thesis.
Justice Goldberg begins with the statement that liberty
is not confined to the specific terms of the Bill of Rights,
but protects fundamental personal rights, including the
right of marital privacy, equal protection and the right to
pursue an occupation, which are not explicitly in the
Constitution.

He relies on precedent, i.e., former U.S.

Supreme Court decisions, and refers to the Ninth Amendment.
He quotes from an earlier Supreme Court case, Snyder v.
Massachusetts, a s

follows:

"The Court stated many years

ago that the Due Process Clause protects those liberties
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that are 'so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our
people as to be ranked as f u n d a m e n t a l 9 2 T h i s

is an argu

ment from both precedent (former case law) and history and
tradition.
J. Goldberg then turns to the Ninth Amendment and
addresses at length the intent of the Framers, particularly
Madison, with regard to its enactment.
reads:

The Ninth Amendment

"The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain

rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others
retained by the people." The Amendment was the work of
Madison and, Goldberg argues, was designed to address the
fear that a bill of specifically enumerated rights could not
be sufficiently broad to protect all the essential rights
and the specific mention of certain rights might be seen as
a denial that other rights were also protected.
J. Goldberg then quotes Justice Story, from his
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
(1891), as a sort of history or tradition of interpretation
regarding the Ninth Amendment.
saying:

J. Goldberg summarizes by

"These statements of Madison and Story make clear

that the Framers did not intend that the first eight amend
ments be construed to exhaust the basic and fundamental
rights which the Constitution guaranteed to the people."93
Justice Goldberg next turns to an historical analysis

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

43
of the Ninth Amendment.

While the Ninth Amendment has not

often been relied on by the Court, it has been part of the
Constitution since 1791, is intended to have weight, and
should be given effect.
To hold that a right so basic and fundamental
and so deep-rooted in our society as the right
of privacy in marriage may be infringed because
that right is not guaranteed in so many words by
the first eight amendments to the Constitution
is to ignore the Ninth Amendment and give it no
effect whatsoever.
Justice Goldberg again refers to the intent of the Framers
that there exist fundamental rights not specifically enu
merated and the Bill of Rights is not exhaustive of those
rights.

The Supreme Court has often held that the Fifth and

Fourteenth Amendments protect certain fundamental liberties
from infringement by both federal and state government.
Goldberg's use of the Ninth Amendment, therefore, merely
"serves to support what this Court has been doing in pro
tecting fundamental rights.
Goldberg also answers Black's charge, in a dissenting
opinion, that his Ninth Amendment analysis turns
"somersaults with h i s t o r y . J *
being faithful to history.

Goldberg argues he is

Though the Ninth Amendment ori

ginally was concerned only with restrictions on federal
power, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states as well
from abridging fundamental personal liberties.

"And, the
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Ninth Amendment, in indicating that not all such liberties
are specifically mentioned in the first eight amendments,

is

surely relevant in showing the existence of other fundamen
tal personal rights, now protected from state, as well as
federal, infringement."98

He summarizes with the statement

that the Ninth Amendment "simply lends strong support" to
the view that the "liberty" interests protected by the
Constitution are broader than those listed in the Bill of
Ri gh ts.
The argument now takes an interesting turn.

J.

Goldberg addresses the charge of subjectivism, i.e., the
claim that his interpretation would leave judges "at large
to decide cases in light of their personal and private
notions."100

In answering this charge, he refers to several

important statements by the Supreme Court regarding the
sources of its holdings affecting fundamental rights.

This

is an argument based in precedent and an attempt to show the
principles underlying this series of cases.

In speaking of

judges, J. Goldberg states:
They must look to the "traditions and
[collective] conscience of our people" to deter
mine whether a principle is "so rooted [there]
. . . as to be ranked as fundamental."
Snyder
V . Massachusetts, 291 U.S.
97, 105.
The
inquiry is whether a right involved "is of such
a character that it cannot be denied without
violating those 'fundamental principles of
liberty and justice which lie at the base of all
our civil and political institutions'. . . ."
Powell V. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 67.
"Liberty"
also "gains content from the limitation of . . .
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specific [constitutional! guarantees" and "from
experience with the requirements of a free
society."
Poe v. Oilman, 367 U.S. 497, 517.101
Justice Goldberg is criticized by Justice Black in
dissent because use of this terminology and tradition will
require "judges to determine what is or is not constitu
tional on the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are
unwise or unnecessary."102

Justice Black's criticism of

Goldberg's analysis will be addressed later in this paper.
J. Goldberg further says that privacy is a fundamental
personal right which, again quoting P oe , arises "from the
totality of the constitutional scheme under which we
l iv e ."103

He quotes Justice Brandeis, from 01mstead v.

United States,104 on the principles underlying the constitu
tion's guarantees of privacy, to the effect that the makers
of the constitution "conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone— the most comprehensive of rights
and the right most valued by civilized

m e n .

"105

Justice Goldberg cites Meyer v . Nebraska,105 Pierce v .
Society of Sisters,10^ and Prince v. Massachusetts,108 in
support of the position that the Court’s decisions "have
respected the private realm of family life which the State
cannot en ter."109

The Connecticut statutes, he points out,

seek to regulate a vital and sensitive area of privacy,
viz., marital sexual relations and home life.

"Of this
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whole 'private realm of family life' it is difficult to ima
gine what is more private or more intimate than a husband
and wife's marital relations."HO

This is an appeal to com

monality, as no authority is cited for this position.
Goldberg states it as a given that nothing is more intimate
between married people than sexual relations.
He speaks of the "entire fabric of the
Constitution,"111 demonstrating that marital privacy is a
fundamental right.

He then makes a personal statement which

again involves testimony as to the force of the right of
privacy in marriage and an implicit appeal to the com
monality of the reader:

"Although the Constitution does not

speak in so many words of the right of privacy in marriage,
jC cannot believe that it offers these fundamental rights no
protection."112

Justice Goldberg could develop this aspect

of his argument more fully by addressing the sanctity of
marriage on a more personal level and appealing to the com
monality of the listener.

It should be noted, however, that

such an approach is implicit in his argument, as Goldberg is
acknowledging his position as an existing individual who is
asked to evaluate a law which is said to encroach upon a
constitutionality protected fundamental right.

He

acknowledges the "I," the existing individual, who is forced
to take a stand on an issue, here the decision regarding the
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Connecticut statutes, based on the best possible information
he can gather.

This acknowledgement of the human existen

tial perspective is, I believe, essential to honest and
effective judicial decision making and contrasts markedly
with the position that one is just following precedent,
i.e., judge as "cog" in a mechanical process which need only
be set in motion by earlier decisions.

Goldberg's open

acknowledgement of his involvement in the issue he is
deciding is honest and important in avoiding both a mechani
cal jurisprudential approach and a "sub specie alternatus"
viewpoint, both of which see the issue as patently clear and
requiring no "messy" human decision making.
Justice Goldberg further argues that letting the
Connecticut statutes stand would permit "experimentation by
the states in the area of the fundamental personal rights of
its citizens. " Ü 3
this power.

The State, Goldberg argues, does not have

He then uses an analogy to the State decreeing

that all married couples be sterilized after having two
children.

Even though the law might be thought "silly"

(the

words used in dissent by J. Stewart), it would not be sub
ject to constitutional challenge as the Constitution does
not specifically prevent the government from abridging the
marital right to bear children and raise a family.

"If upon

a showing of a slender basis of rationality, a law outlawing
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voluntary birth control by married persons is valid, then,
by the same reasoning, a law requiring complusory birth
control also would seem to be val id."114

j.

Goldberg, of

course, thinks both laws represent an unconstitutional
intrusion on the right of marital privacy.
Since the Connecticut statutes impose upon a fundamen
tal personal right, Goldberg argues, the state must prove a
"compelling state interest" to justify the law.

A showing

of a mere "rational relation" of the law to the desired
result is not enough to pass constitutional requirements.
This is a reliance on precedent and past decisions affecting
the constitution.

Connecticut argues there is a rational

relation between the law and its desired result {prevention
of extra-marital affairs).
met by the state.

However, even this burden is not

The statute is unnecessarily broad and

intrudes on the privacy of all married couples.

The State's

interest in safeguarding marital fidelity could be served
more effectively by a more precisely drafted statute.

J.

Goldberg cites NAACP v. Button,^15 for the principle that;
" [p]recision of regulation must be the touchstone in an area
so closely touching our most precious freedoms.

since

the statute is unnecessarily broad, it cannot stand.
J. Goldberg concludes his opinion by distinguishing his
position from the proper regulation of sexual promiscuity or
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misconduct.

Again quoting from Poe, J. Goldberg approves;

"It is one thing when the State exerts its power either to
forbid extra-marital sexuality . . . or to say who may
marry, but it is quite another wh en, having acknowledged a
marriage and the intimacies inherent in it, it undertakes to
regulate by means of the criminal law the details of that
intimacy.
J. Goldberg's opinion is a good example of a principled
judicial decision of the type argued for here.

He

repeatedly relies on precedent, i.e., judicial tradition,
and the intent of the Framers, i.e.. Constitutional tradi
tion.

He addresses the criticism that his position is sub

jective and adopts an existential perspective in openly
acknowledging his involvement as decision maker.

He testi

fies regarding the sanctity of marital privacy from this "I"
perspective.

He also fruitfully uses analogy at one point

in the opinion.

The opinion is a fine example of the best

possible justification, all things considered, for reaching
a judicial decision.
The second concurring opinion was written by Justice
Harlan.

J. Harlan agrees with the judgment, but for dif

ferent reasons.

He sees the proper question as "whether

this Connecticut statute infringes the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment because the enactment violates
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basic values "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty,"
Palko

V.

Connecticut. 302 U.S. 319,

3 2 5

.

j.

Harlan

believes that it does and that one need not even refer to
any specific right in the Bill of Rights, or "any of their
radiations."119

He then makes the now famous remark;

"The

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment stands, in my
opinion, on its own bottom."120
Justice Harlan then takes issue with the position of
dissenting Justices Black and Stewart, who advocate an
"incorporation" approach to constitutional law.

First of

all, Harlan claims, there are no historical grounds for
adopting an incorporation position.

Secondly, it is an

illusion to believe that limiting the content of Fourteenth
Amendment due process to the protection of rights found only
in the Bill of Rights will confine judges to "interpreting"
specific constitutional provisions and restrain injection of
their own ideas of constitutional right and wrong into the
"vague contours of the Due Process Clause."1^1
This is an insightful observation by J. Harlan.

He

believes in "judicial self restraint," but thinks Black's
suggested formula for achieving it "is more hollow than
r e a l ."122

This is because "'Specific' provisions of the

Constitution, no less than "due process," lend themselves as
readily to "personal" interpretations by judges whose
constitutional outlook is simply to keep the Constitution in
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supposed 'tune with the times.'"12 3

Thus Harlan wisely

rejects any mechanical or "neutral" theory of judicial deci
sion making.

Harlan's position is that it is impossible to

avoid injecting personal interpretations into constitutional
analysis.

It is certainly impossible to avoid personal opi

nions by claiming to "interpret" the Bill of Rights by means
of an incorporation approach.

This is further acknowledge

ment of an existential perspective, i.e., one which openly
acknowledges the limited perspective of the existing indivi
dual as the basis for judicial decision making.
On the other hand, J. Harlan is not advocating a relativistic approach to law, i.e., where law is dictated merely
by the personal, subjective opinions of judges.

He believes

in judicial self-restraint, which can only be brought about
by:

(1) continual insistence upon respect for the teachings

of history;

(2) solid recognition of the basic values which

underlie our society; and (3) appreciation of the importance
of federalism and separation of powers in establishing and
fostering freedom in American.
J. Harlan admits that adherence to these principles
will not do away with differences of interpretation
regarding the Constititution.
attempt to do so.

Nor, he adds, should it

Continued recognition of these principles

will, however, "go farther toward keeping most judges from
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roaming at large in the constitutional field than will the
interpolation into the Constitution of an artificial and
largely illusory restriction on the content of the Due
Process Clause."125
J. Harlan advocates a principled approach based on
respect for our history, values and political heritage.
This principled approach allows for the use of testimony and
appeal and is amenable to a naturalist interpretation.

It

does not attempt to decide cases by fiat, but leaves room
for disagreement and principled debate over these important
issues.

The restraints placed on the judges wil l, however,

keep them from roaming wherever they please in search of a
rationale.

Just as importantly, Harlan charges Justice

Black with holding a self-deceptive position.

The decision

maker/observer is always bound up with what is being
understood.

The key to judicial restraint is an openness,

sensitivity and faithfulness to those things which animate
the law.

It is this faithfulness to the most significant

and widest possible justification for decision making which
leads to the best possible judgment, all things
considered.
Justice Black wrote a long dissent, which can be
distilled for purposes of this paper.

He begins by saying

that "evil qualities" in a law do not make it
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unconstitutional.127

This gist of J. Black's

"incorporation" approach to constitutional law is that the
Fourteenth Amendment incorporates into law only the
"specific" provisions of the Bill of Rights.

"I like my

privacy as well as the next o n e , but I am nevertheless com
pelled to admit that government has a right to invade it
unless prohibited by some specific constitutional
provision."128

j. Black disagrees with Justices Harlan and

Goldberg and posits that neither the Due Process clause nor
the Ninth Amendment could ever be a proper basis for invali
dating the Connecticut statutes.

He accuses them of using

the power of the Court "to invalidate any legislative act
which the judges find irrational, unreasonable or
offensive."129
Justice Black next lists the "catchwords and catch
phrases" which judges have used to strike down laws "which
offend their notions of natural justice."130

He sees the

Court as giving itself the power to invalidate all state
laws it deems "to be arbitrary, capricious, unreasonable, or
oppressive, or on this Court's belief that a particular
state law under scrutiny has no "rational or justifying"
purpose, or is offensive to a "sense of fairness and
justice."Ill

Black saw any theory based on "natural jus

tice" as requiring judges to make a totally subjective deci
sion, i.e., as deciding the constitutionality of a law "on
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the basis of their own appraisal of what laws are unwise or
u n n e c e s s a r y

."132

He goes on to point out that no specific

Constitutional provision gives this "supervisory veto" over
legislative policy decisions.

He then makes a statement

which advocates a universal constitutional imprimatur for
legislative decisions:

"perhaps it is not too much to say

that no legislative body ever does pass laws without
believing that they will accomplish a sane, rational, wise
and justifiable purpose."133

That is, since there is always

a rational legislative intent, and legislative intent is
determinative of the constitutionality of a state statute,
all legislative actions pass constitutional muster.
J, Black sees practically any judicial invalidation of
legislative actions as "natural law due process
p h i l o s o p h y .

"134

The Court, Justice Black believes, only

measures constitutionality by its own personal standards and
then applies words like "arbitrary, capricious, unreaso
nable, accomplishes no justifiable purpose," etc., to cover
up the personal nature of these decisions.

J. Black uses a

quotation from a treatise by Justice Learned Hand, which he
adopts without reservation:
Judges are seldom content merely to annul the
particular solution before them; they do not,
indeed they may not, say that taking all things
into consideration, the legislators' solution is
too strong for the judicial stomach.
On the
contrary, they wrap up their veto in a protec
tive veil of adjectives such as 'arbitrary,'
'artificial,' 'normal,' 'reasonable,'
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'inherent,' 'fundamental,' or 'essential,' whose
office usually, though quite innocently, is to
disguise what they are doing and impute to it a
derivation far more impressive than their per
sonal preferences, which are all that in fact
lie behind the decision.
Black uses this quotation as an appeal to precedent, or at
least to a well known legal scholar, in support of his posi
tion .
Black further says the intent of the Framers was not to
give the federal courts power to recommend or veto bad or
unwise congressional legislation.

In support of this posi

tion he cites extensively from The Records of the Federal
Convention of 1787.^36
J. Black next turns to criticize Goldberg's argument
that judges need not use their "personal and private
notions" in striking down state legislation-

Black conclu

des such personal justifications cannot be validated for the
following reasons:

(1) the Court cannot take Gallup polls;

(2) there is no modern scientific way to determine "what
traditions are rooted in the 'collective conscience of our
people'";

(3) the Framers did not intend the Ninth Amendment

to give the federal judiciary veto power over state legisla
tion;

(4) the history of the Ninth Amendment shows its

intent was to limit, not broaden, federal powers;

(5) the

"broad unlimited power" to hold laws unconstitutional
because offensive is not based on the Constitution, but is
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"bestowed on the Court by the Court"; and (6) the power the
Court has given itself makes the "Court's members a day-today constitutional convention."13?
J. Black accuses the Court of "Lochnerizing" and taking
over the proper role of the legislature "to invalidate sta
tutes because of application of 'natural law' deemed to be
above and undefined by the Constitution is . . . [to] roam
at will in the limitless area of their own beliefs as to
reasonableness . . . ."138
Justice Black again quotes Judge Learned Hand regarding
invalidating "offensive" legislation:

"For myself it would

be most irksome to be ruled by a bevy of Platonic Guardians,
even if I knew how to choose them, which I assuredly do
n o t ."139

He then concludes his opinion with the statement

that the Connecticut statutes are "not forbidden by any pro
vision of the Federal Constitution as that Constitution was
written . . .",140 for which reason he would uphold their
constitutionality.
The final opinion in the case is written by Justice
Potter Stewart and adds little to Black's analysis.

He

begins by calling the Connecticut statutes an "uncommonly
silly law," "unwise" and "asinine."141

However, the statu

tes do not violate the Federal Constitution.
"general right of privacy" in:

He finds no

(1) the Bill of Rights;
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any part of the Constitution;
the

C o u r t .

142

(3) any case ever decided by

He concludes by saying the Court should

subordinate its personal views and own ideas of proper
legislation, while allowing the people to follow the proper
constitutional procedure for removing laws from the books,
viz., persuading their elected representatives to repeal the
l a w . 1 4 3

What is disturbing about both Black’s and Stewart's
analysis is the continual insistence on judicial interpreta
tion as clearly black and white.

The judge either looks at

the specific words of the Constitution itself and uses these
as the only basis for a decision, or the judge falls into
mere personal preference, i.e., subjectivistic/relativistic
decisions.

One either follows the letter of the

Constitution or is adrift, anchorless, without principle, in
a sea of possible personal preferences.
This is a false dichotomy, with serious inherent flaws.
Though some of the problems with this approach were outlined
earlier in this paper, it is important that the inherent
dangers be understood.

First, this position constitutes a

denial of the basic human situation, i.e., of the heuristic
task of interpreting even the basically "clear" things in
life.

Secondly, it is a failure to acknowledge the fun

damental insight that we do not control language and cannot
delimit rigid parameters within which language is forced to
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fit and give its meaning.
Dwells"144

In the essays "Poetically Man

and "Language,"145 Martin Heidegger develops the

conception of "the true relation of dominance between
language and man.
speaks."146

For, strictly, it is language that

Heidegger develops the idea that language leads

man around by the nose.

We do not control the way even con

temporary utterances come to have meaning or the many
variations and interpretations possible.

When one tries to

limit the "intent of the Framers" to explicit words written
over two-hundred years ago, the problem is compounded many
times over.

A third serious problem with Black's analysis

is the tendency to put oneself in the position of having the
"one true interpretation" of the Constitution.

This

authoritarian approach to the Constitution leaves no room
for debate or principled analysis.

The corresponding danger

is, of course, that one has adopted a position, based on an
interpretation of the Constitution, while believing that one
is only following the "true" constitutional interpretation
which is, in Black's view, ultimately not an
"interpretation" at all.

The fourth problem with the

Black/Stewart analysis is that it adopts the entire
fact/value dichotomy mentioned earlier in this paper.

Facts

are graspable and understandable, they have substance and
solidity, while values are fleeting and are merely
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expressions of personal preferences.

This program would

deny the values underlying the specific amendments in the
Constitution and treat the words, what is really "there," as
a given.

No inquiry into "mushy" values is allowed, as all

that is certain are the explicit words as given.

The danger

here, as stated earlier, is the total loss of spirit which
animates and gives continued force to the Constitution.

If

the Constitution is to remain a vital document, continued
acknowledgement of the values which gave rise to it and of
the forces which give rise to the values, is essential.
Finally, Black's approach is an example of modern man's
desire to be in control, to have the parameters of relevance
and significance within one's direction.

If one need not

engage in serious debate and effort in order to determine
what the true values in the Constitution are and how to be
most true to them, i.e., if this is merely mechanical, then
judges are in "control" of constitutional analysis.
Heidegger also offers valuable insight into this drive to
control in his essay "The Question Concerning Technology."
Black himself says we have no scientific means to
determine the traditions rooted in the people’s collective
conscience.This

is a reflection of the desire for

control and certainty which would gladly do away with the
human decision maker for the promise of knowing, without
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question, that the proper decision was reached.
The second area of case law examined here is tort law,
specifically MacPherson v. Buick.

It raises interesting

additional issues, as the principles in a common law area,
such as torts, are not as explicit as in a constitutional
case.

This thesis, therefore, first looks to two authori

ties in tort law, viz., William Prosser and Clarence Morris,
for statements of some of the principles underlying the law
of torts.

The thesis then outlines Judge Cardozo's opinion.

First of all, it will be helpful to outline some
general principles, cited by Prosser, which affect tort
liability.

A tort is, in simple terms, a civil wrong.

The

person who has been injured (plaintiff) brings an action
(lawsuit) against the person who has "wronged" him
(defendant).

A common tort situation would involve a per

sonal injury resulting from a car accident.
party sued the driver of

If the injured

the other vehicle for negligence,

this would be a tort action.
It is a fundamental
a plaintiff has suffered

principle of tort law that the fact
a loss is not, in and of itself, a

sufficient reason to make the defendant liable for the loss.
Prosser cites several factors affecting tort liability,
including:

(1) the moral aspect of defendant's conduct,

i.e., "no liability without fault" (though this has changed
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somewhat in recent strict liability actions);
development (new social ideas);

(2) historical

(3) convenience of admi

nistration ("floodgates" argument, e.g., no liability for
cruel words, jostling in public, etc.);

(4) capacity to bear

loss (finding a reason to shift loss to defendant who can
better bear it); and (5) preventing future harm and
punishing wrongdoers (punitive damages).

Prosser also

refers to the motive of the defendant and says it is often
determinative whether the "social value of the objective is
sufficient to outweigh the gravity of the interference."149
Finally, Prosser's view is of the "law of torts as battle
field of the conflict between capital and labor . . . and
others who have conflicting claims in the economic
struggle."150
Clarence Morrisl^l gives a similar, though less
detailed, analysis of the principles underlying the law of
torts.

Morris is concerned to stress the relation of "tort

law and the common good."

He sees the central problem of

most tort cases as "whether plaintiff or defendant should
bear a loss,"152 and lists his basic axiom as follows;

"A

loss should lie where it has happened to fall unless some
affirmative public good will result from shifting it."153
Morris is against the use of public power unless such legal
intervention will advance the "public good."

A shift is
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justified only when affirmative policy reasons can be given
for requiring the defendant to bear a loss."154
These are commonly viewed as the underlying principles
of the law of tort, even if not made explicit in individual
cases.

The leading case of MacPherson v. Buick provides an

excellent illustration of the application of some of these
principles.
MacPherson v. Buick is a landmark case in the law of
torts.

The fact situation of the case is as follows:

Motor Co., the defendant, is an auto manufacturer.

Buick

Buick

sold a car to a retail dealer, which the dealer resold to
MacPherson, the plaintiff.

While plaintiff was driving the

car, one of the wheels suddenly collapsed, throwing
MacPherson out of the car and injuring him.

The wheel

collapsed because it was made of defective wood and its
spokes crumbled into fragments.

Buick did not make the

wheel, but bought it from another manufacturer.

The evi

dence indicated, however, that the defects were discoverable
by reasonable inspection, and that such an inspection was
not made.

There was no claim the defendant willfully con

cealed or even knew of the defect.

The defendant is thus

not charged with fraud, but negligence.

"The question to be

determined is whether the defendant owed a duty of care and
vigilance to anyone but the immediate purchaser."155
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A little background on this issue is important in
understanding the context of J. Cardozo's decision.
Winterbottom v.

W r i g h t ,

In

156 the Court of Exchequer held that

the breach of a contract to keep a mailcoach in repair after
it was sold did not give rise to a cause of action, in
contract or tort,
was

on behalf of a passenger in the coach who

injured when it collapsed.

This case was generally

interpreted to mean there was no liability for a contracting
party to one with whom he was not in a relationship of
"privity."

This meant that an original seller of goods was

not liable for damages caused by their defects to anyone but
the immediate buyer.

Several reasons were advanced for this

position.
One was that the seller's misconduct was not the
cause of thedamage to the consumer in a legal
sense, because no such harm was to be antici
pated from any defects in the goods, and there
was an intervening resale by a responsible
party, which 'insulated the negligence of the
manufacturer' . . . .
A second reason, which
was typical of the social viewpoint of the nine
teenth century, was that it would place too
heavy a burden upon manufacturers and sellers to
hold them responsible to hundreds of persons at
a distance whose identity they could not even
know, and that it was better to let the consumer
suffer.
The courts created several exceptions to Winterbottom,
the most important of which held a seller liable to third
persons for the sale of an article "imminently" or
"inherently" dangerous to human safety.

J. Cordozo in his
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opinion in MacPherson focuses on Thomas v. Winchester,158 a
leading case, which allowed a customer to recover damages
from the manufacturer/seller of a falsely labeled poison,
even though the sale was made by a druggist in between the
original seller and customer.

The rationale for the holding

in Thomas, according to J. Cardozo, was that a falsely
labeled poison is likely to injure anyone who receives it
and there is a duty to avoid the injury because the danger
is foreseeable.

The Court cited cases where manufacturers

were not subject to a duty absent contract and distinguished
these cases on the basis that the manufacturer's negligence
was not likely to result in harm to any but an immediate
purchaser.
Cardozo spends a paragraph on subsequent cases which
give a "narrow construction" of the principle of Thomas and
then turns to those cases which "evince a more liberal
spirit."159
V.

The first case in the latter category is Devlin

Smith, w h i c h

involved the defendant's construction of

a scaffold for a painter.

When the painter's employees were

injured due to its collapse, the defendant contractor was
held to owe them a duty, irrespective of his contract with
their employer, to build the scaffold with care, since he
knew the scaffold would be used by the workmen and also knew
the scaffold was dangerous if improperly constructed.
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Statler v. Ray Mfg.

C o .

,161 the defendant manufactured a

large coffee urn which was installed in a restaurant.
urn exploded when used, injuring the plaintiff.

The

The Court

held the manufacturer liable.
J. Cardozo acknowledges that Devlin and Statler may
have extended the rule of Thomas.
committed to the extension."162

"If so, this court is

cardozo rejected the

"restricted meaning" of "inherently dangerous" as something
whose usual function is to injure or destroy.

A scaffold,

while not inherently destructive, becomes such if imper
fectly constructed and "A large coffee urn may have within
itself, if negligently made, the potency of danger, yet no
one things of it as an implement whose normal function is
destruction."163
Cordozo thus acknowledges his commitment to the exten
sion of Thomas, as evidenced in Devlin and Statler.

This is

an extension of protection to the consumer/user, not part of
the prior law.

Cardozo also refers to this movement as "the

trend of judicial thought."164
In addition to the change in the meaning of a "thing of
danger," i.e., reasonably certain to place life and limb in
peril when negligently made, the element of contract or pri
vity is also changed.

"If to the element of danger there is

added knowledge that the thing will be used by persons other
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than the purchaser, and used without new tests, then
irrespective of contract, the manufacturer of this thing of
danger is under a duty to make it carefully."165

in addi

tion, the

Court added a requirement of the manufacturer's

knowledge

of probable danger.

"Thepresence of a known

danger, attendant upon a known use, makes vigilance a
d u t y ."166

Finally, the obligation of the manufacturer does

not arise from contract:

"We have put the source of the

obligation where it ought to be.

We have put its source in

the law."16 7
Cardozo is saying the obligation of the manufacturer is
so important that it cannot rest on a contractual basis
alone, but deserves a stronger foundation in the law.
Cardozo* s point that

the Court ought to extend such protec

tion to consumers/users,
At a

It is

by law, and J. Cardozo does so.

later point in his argument, Cardozo points out

the nature of an auto

gives warning of probable danger if it

is defectively constructed.

MacPherson*s car was designed

to go fifty miles an hour and, without sound wheels, injury
was almost certain.

He then analogizes the case to a defec

tive railroad engine

and concludes they are equally things

of danger.

In declining to follow Winterbottom, J.

Cardozo

commented:

"Precedents drawn from the days of travel by

stage coach do not fit the conditions of travel today.
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principle that the danger must be imminent does not change,
but the things subject to the principle do change.

They are

whatever the needs of life in a developing civilization
require them to be."168
Several points are important in this statement.

First

is Cardozo’s distinguishing the precedent of Winterbottom.
This shows the case to be of a different type and past judi
cial history is not merely being discarded.

The second

important point is Cardozo's adherence to principle, which
he says does not change.

This establishes continuity,

within a decision which looks revolutionary.

It is an

attempt to show the order and fidelity to principle which
underlies MacPherson.

Finally, Cardozo states the things

subject to the principle depend upon social progress.

In

summary, the three important steps in Cardozo's analysis
are:

(1) distinction;

(2) faithful adherence to principle;

and (3) social progress.
Cardozo makes use of a second analogy in his justifica
tion for the MacPherson decision:
There is nothing anomalous in a rule which im
poses upon A, who has contracted with B, a duty
to C and D and others according as he knows or
does not know that the subject matter of the
contract is intended for their use . . . if A
leases a building to be used by the lessee at
once as a place of entertainment . . . injury to
persons other than the lessee is to be foreseen,
and foresight of the consequences involves the
creation of a d u t y . 1^9

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

68
This is a good analogy, as it draws upon a different
substantive area of law (property) to show foreseeability
involves the creation of a duty.
Cardozo concludes the opinion by holding Buick Motor
Co.

liable to MacPherson because, as a manufacturer of

autos, it was responsible for the finished product and is
not absolved from the duty of inspection and testing of com
ponent parts.

Buick should not have relied on the skill of

the wheel manufacturer, but has a higher duty of care and
inspection to the user.
MacPherson v. Buick is a good example of a principled
approach to legal reasoning for several reasons.

First,

Cardozo openly acknowledges that he is committed to
extending protection to plaintiffs and holding manufacturers
liable for their products.

Citing case law which tended to

broaden the definition of inherently dangerous, he refers to
"trends of judicial thought."

Cardozo also acknowledges

such an important obligation should be enforced by law and
not depend on a contractual relation analysis.

The basis of

this "ought" is never made explicit by Cardozo, but seems
rather to be between the lines of the opinion.

It is the

weakest aspect of the opinion that Cardozo does not develop
more policy behind the decision.

The use of principled

discourse might allow an appeal to commonality regarding who
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should be liable and whether it is fair that defendant Buick
Motor Co. be or not be liable in this situation.

Again, I

believe this underlies Cardozo's analysis, but it is never
made explicit in the opinion.

For example, Cardozo could

have explicitly appealed to the commonality of the reader,
by asking whether it is just that MacPherson bear the
responsibility for the original condition of the wheels on
his car.

This might involve an explicit economic analysis,

or a moral claim regarding the appropriateness of loss
shifting.

It might also require an investigation of why it

is appropriate to hold manufacturer's responsible for their
products.

Though this part of the opinion could be more

explicit, Cardozo does responsibly articulate the principles
underlying tort law, as illustrated by Prosser and Morris,
and apply them with good judgment and sensitivity.
Cardozo's distinguishing of cases, his stated adherence
to established principle and his concern with developing a
legal system responsive to the needs of a changing society
are strong points in this opinion and constitute open
acknowledgement of the sources and bases for his decision.
Cardozo is concerned with the best possible justification,
all things considered, for his decision and clarifies the
principles he is following.
His concern is to draw upon all previous case law and
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put it into a coherent framework.
the law to appear

He clearly does not want

as unprincipled chaos, but ratherwants

his "chapter" of the novel to fit
whole, i.e., to actually ^

into the structure as a

a novel.

In this way, Cardozo

can reinterpret what has gone before and influence what
comes after.

Such a principled approach to decision making

is well within the framework proposed earlier in this paper.
It is illustrative to read the disssenting opinion in
MacPherson by Chief Justice Willard Bartlett.

Judge

Bartlett stated:
I think that
these rulings .. . extend the
liability of
the vendor of a manufactured
article further than any case which has yet
received the sanction of this court . . . .
I
do not see how we can uphold the judgment in the
present case without overruling what has been so
often said by this court and other courts of
like authority in reference to the absence of
any liability for negligence on the part of the
original vendor of an ordinary carriage to
anyone except his immediate vendee.170
It is, of course, just such rigid adherence to prece
dent that Cardozo and a principled approach to law avoid.
It is this sort of supposedly "neutral" following of prece
dent that can be most dangerous because it is self-deceptive
in refusing to acknowledge both the social view which is
being reinforced through law and the participation of the
decision maker himself in the result.

The social view the

dissenting opinion would reinforce is that the manufacturer
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cannot be burdened with the expense of paying for injures to
those with whom there is no direct contractual relationship.
The participation of the decision maker is as human being
(or as close as a lawyer can come to being human), who is
faced with prior decisions, a present case, personal pre
ferences, policy arguments, equitable concerns, political
history, moral tradition, constitutional background, etc.
The judge's hands are not tied and he should not act as if
they are.

This is not, of course, to say precedent can be

thrown out the window with each case before the bench.

It

is to affirm, however, that although Judge Bartlett's opi
nion would have the reader believe he is just following
proper procedures, judicial decision making is not, and
should not be, a mechanical process.
Chapter III now places this thesis within the liberal
judicial tradition and defendas it against an important new
legal tradition, the "critical theorists."

The chapter then

concludes with some thoughts on the ultimate import of any
theory of judicial decision making.
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CHAPTER III
It is important to note that Dworkin's naturalist
approach and the principled discourse method of legal justi
fication are well within the liberal political orientation
and the liberal judicial tradition.

Liberalism is used here

as that political and legal philosophy which is
distinguished by a firm line of demarcation between the pri
vate and public realms.171
Liberals conceive public institutions as the only
authority which may legitimately proscribe individual
action.

Traditionally a liberal government is seen to

endorse no specific theory of what is good for individuals
in their private lives.

"The theory of the good espoused by

Liberalism is that the state should not endorse any par
ticular theory of the

g o o d .

"172

Liberal legal theorists

have built theories of judicial decision-making consistent
with the public/private realm distinction.

Though liberal

theorists may differ on details regarding the working out of
a liberal jurisprudence,
They share fundamental beliefs:
the idea that
rational decision does guide judicial discre
tion, that pre-existing rules and principles can
be applied to a new situation in a disciplined
manner, that individual choices can be made (and
indeed are desirable), that reason is powerful,
and that analysis is p o s s i b l e . 173
underlying liberalism's position of not advocating any
72

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

73
specific theory of the good are, of course, substantive
liberal ideals.

Liberalism generally maintains that

treating individuals with equal respect and concern requires
free choice by individuals.

Only if individuals are treated

as being capable of free choice in matters of private mora
lity are they being treated as equals.

Consider the

following two statements;
liberalism insists that government must treat
people as equals in the following sense.
It
must impose no sacrifice or constraint upon any
citizen in virtue of an argument that the citi
zen could not accept without abandoning his
sense of his equal worth . . . .
So liberalism
as based on equality justifies the traditional
liberal principle that government should not
enforce private m o r a l i t y .
a liberal state must be neutral on what may be
called the question of the good life. The
constitutive morality of liberalism— its
requirement that people be treated with equal
respect and concern— presupposes that many
conflicting and even incommensurable conceptions
of what is good in life may be fully compatible
with free, autonomous, and rational action. A
liberal state allows these conceptions to com
pete with and to accommodate each other within
institutions or arrangements that are fair or
neutral among them.l?^
John Rawls' A Theory of Justice is, of course, foundational
in presenting the ideas underlying treating persons with
equal respect and concern.

His view of these issues is most

evident in his definition of primary goods as things persons
would want whatever else they would want.
The position on judicial interpretations proposed in
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this thesis is consistent with liberalism as outlined above,
though it involves explicit recognition of the deeper
substantive values of liberalism which sometimes go unre
cognized by liberals themselves.

It is contended, moreover,

that this position is not subject to the critical theorists'
charges of formalism, objectivism and instrumentalism, which
might be leveled at any liberalism which fails to
acknowledge its substantive ideals.
The "radical critique" of liberal theories of judicial
decision-making attacks liberalism at its

f o u n d a t i o n s .

176

This paper will focus on the work of Robert Unger, a major
figure in the critical legal studies movement and Professor
of Law at Harvard University.
Unger believes that two basic concerns characterize the
critical legal studies tradition.
of formalism and objectivism.

The first is a critique

In its extreme form, for

malism proposes a deductive or quasi-deductive method for
attaining determinate solutions to particular legal
problems, i.e., "the search for a method of deduction from a
gapless system of rules."I??

However, this conception of

formalism is the limiting case and a "straw man."

The real

meaning of formalism which Unger seeks to counter "is a com
mitment to, and therefore also a belief in the possibility
of, a method of legal justification that can be clearly
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contrasted to open-ended disputes about the basic terms of
social life, disputes that people call ideological, philo
sophical or visionary."178

The formalism Unger describes

"characteristically invokes impersonal purposes, policies
and principles as an indispensable component of legal
r e a s o n i n g .

"179

This is the neutrality which traditional

liberals often seek to try to provide.
Formalism's second major thesis, as outlined by Unger,
is that "legal doctrine" is only realizable through an
essentially apolitical analysis.

Unger defines legal

doctrine as a form of conceptual practice with two charac
teristics:

(1) "the willingness to work from the institu

tionally defined materials of a given collective tradition";
and (2) "the claim to speak authoritatively within this
tradition . . .
power."180

to affect the application of state

unger restates this second thesis as the belief

in a fundamental difference between law making and law
application, with legislation "guided only by the looser
rationality of ideological conflict."181
Unger next defines objectivism, the second liberal
principle which the critical legal studies movement attempts
to discredit.

Objectivism is "the belief that the authori

tative legal materials— the system of statutes, cases and
accepted legal ideas— embody and sustain a defensible scheme
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of human association.

They display, though always imper

fectly, an intelligible moral order."182

Alternatively the

system is viewed as the result of constraints, such as eco
nomic efficiency, which have a normative force when combined
with human desires.

Objectivism rejects the view that laws

are "merely the outcome of contingent power struggles or of
practical pressures lacking in rightful authority."183
The modern lawyer, Unger argues, can't keep his for
malist perspective without maintaining the objectivist
assumptions.

Formalism presupposes objectivism.

One can't

switch from speaking of legislative interest group politics
to invoking impersonal purpose, policy or principle in a
judicial setting.

If one invokes formalistic principles,

Unger argues, these come from either:

(1) a moral or prac

tical order exhibited by the materials themselves; or (2) a
normative theory extrinsic to the law.

If the latter is

true, then, even if the foundation were established indepen
dently of the law, many areas of law would be viewed as
"mistakes," as varying from much accepted legal precedent,
Unger claims this would cause the destruction of an essen
tial part of the "formalist creed," viz., the contrast of
doctrine with ideology and political prophecy.

The for

malist would thus be transformed into "a practitioner of the
free-wheeling criticism of established arrangements and
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received ideas."184
Unger advocates the abandonment of objectivism and the
adoption of an "heroic" approach.

This can be done by

"carrying over to the interpretation of rights the same
shameless talk about interest groups that is thought per
missible in a legislative setting."185

unger uses the

example of a statute which represented a victory for sheep
herders over cattlemen.

This statute "would be applied,

strategically, to advance the former's aims and to confirm
the latter's defeat."186
This liberal understanding of doctrine and formalism
needs to be abandoned, according to Unger, and legal
reasoning viewed as an extension of legislative struggle.
This conception of legal "analysis" would dramatically alter
the way we look at rights.

"The security of rights, so

important to the idea of legality, would fall hostage to the
context-specific calculations of

e f f e c t .

"187

Unger ends his argument by noting that a second charac
teristic theme of leftist movements in modern legal thought
is "the purely instrumental use of legal practice and legal
doctrine to advance leftist aims."188

The connection be

tween these themes, i.e., the skeptical critique and the
"strategic militancy" is negative because it is "almost
entirely limited to the claim that nothing in the nature of
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law or in the conceptual structure of legal thought . . .
constitutes a true obstacle to the advancement of leftist
aims."189
Unger's challenges to liberalism and liberal legal
theory relate directly to the program of this paper and must
therefore be addressed.

A traditional liberal legal

theorist, including Rawls to a certain extent, holds a posi
tion which could be called neutrality liberalism.

It is

important to acknowledge the considerable force of Unger's
critique against this strand of liberal thought.

Rawls, for

example, speaks of "primary goods" as goods which cut across
all social classes.

They are neutral, in that they repre

sent things that all people want, regardless of whatever
else they want.

This conception of primary good subjects

Rawls' view to the charge of formalism, because he believes
the neutral or impersonal nature of primary goods is fun
damental to his liberal theory.

Indeed, any liberalism

which seeks to invoke impersonal or neutral principles, pur
poses or policies, or governmental instrument, will be sub
ject to Unger's formalist critique.

Unger is also correct

in maintaining that traditional liberal formalism presup
poses objectivism.

A neutral formalist principle, such as

Rawls' conception of primary goods, presupposes that the
political order is an intelligible moral order.
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Unger's critique of neutrality liberalism does not have
the same force against the conception of liberal decision
making advocated here, which might be called naturalism
liberalism.

The use of testimony and appeal and the

acknowledgement of the sources which animate the law
substantially enriches the liberal justification of the
legal system.

That is, the position of legal decision

making developed here is not open to the same formalist or
objectivist charges, because the focus here is not on the
neutral or impersonal nature of the purposes, policies and
principles appealed to.

Rather, the emphasis is on what

liberal values are to be found by a living, existing deci
sion maker.

This is anything but impersonal, as the

involvement and participation of the individual is decisive,
and it is not neutral, in an empty sense, because the law is
seen to have force and meaning only through the par
ticipation and involvement of the decision-maker.

The posi

tion developed in this paper thus constitutes a defense of a
naturalistic liberalism.

This thesis shows this position to

be vital, adaptable and workable.

The analysis of Justice

Cardozo in MacPherson v. Buick shows how a principled, con
cerned approach to law can show the system to be "a defen
sible scheme of human association."

Griswold v. Connecticut

also shows the respect for fundamental rights and the
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sensitivity inherent in the liberal view of legal justifica
tion.
With regard to Unger's claim that one cannot adopt for
malism without objectivism, it is possible to acknowledge
the role and force interest groups play in legislative set
tings and the outside forces which could and sometimes do
influence judges.

This does not mean, however, that all

judicial decision making is determined by the pressures and
competition of special interest groups.

In addition, it

does not mean that what _i^ the case is necessarily what
ought to be the case.
Unger sets up a false dichotomy in saying that for
malist principles must be founded either in an order exhi
bited by the materials themselves, or an extrinsic normative
theory.

The best possible political justification, all

things considered, would be true to the materials themselves
and their historical background.

While it might indeed also

draw from a normative theory, this would not necessarily be
extrinsic to the law.

The liberal theorist's use of a nor

mative theory does not transform him into a "free-wheeling"
critic of legal tradition.

The judge is bound by the tradi

tion as a whole and the constraint of creating a "coherent
novel."

If a decision or series of decisions create too

many "mistakes," then the law will be unprincipled, result
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oriented law.

This, however, would be a malfunction or

aberration in the system and not established practice.
Naturalistic liberalism still maintains a strong distinction
between "doctrine" and "political prophecy."

It is just

that Unger, with his view of the decadence of capitalistic,
neutrality liberalism, is unable to see the possibility of a
liberal decision-making which is adaptable and vital in the
way the conception of judicial decision proposed here would
require.
One final concern needs to be addressed in this thesis
relating to the possible charge of subjectivism being
leveled against the liberal judicial program outlined
herein.

"Subjectivism" refers to the belief that all deci

sions are merely personal preferences and that there are no
norms whatsoever which can be appealed to for guidance.

It

is the belief that there is no truth, that one opinion is as
good as any other and that there is, in principle, no
possible way to discriminate between conflicting views,
other than by personal preference.

Thus, there exists,

ultimately, only opinion and not knowledge.

The importance

of defending against subjectivism can be seen by reference
to Justice Black's dissenting opinion in Griswold.

Black

quotes J. Learned Hand's "Platonic Guardian" terminology and
adopts a theory which admits of only two possible alter-
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natives:

literalism or subjectivism.

Thus, Justice Black

would attack the program of this thesis as subjective and
mere personal opinion.

In addition to the criticisms of

Black's position listed earlier in this paper,19 0 his belief
that all non-literal judicial interpretation is mere opinion
shows his own position as nihilistic.

Since very few

jurists can accept Black's literalist position, his charge
that any other position is subjective must be examined and
the nihilistic character of his own thought must be brought
out.

Perhaps reference to an old friend from the history of

philosophy can supply a useful setting for discussion of
these last important issues.
Plato's Republic^^^ is, first of all and largely in
Book I, a conceptual investigation into the nature of
justice.

Secondly, it is an attempt to work out the ideal

state, to see what the form of such a state would be like.
The Republic marks the watershed of Plato's development and
is the best expression of his ideas on justice.
The dialogue begins with a superficial discussion with
Cephalus and Polemarchus on the nature of justice.

Cephalus

essentially defines justice as luxury, while Polymarchus
defines it as giving to others what they are owed.
refutes both of these definitions.

Socrates

The discussion begins in

earnest with the appearance of Thracymacus, who enters the
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dialogue at 336b.

Thracymacus is described as *'a wild beast

about to spring," and advances on Socrates and his company
"as if to tear us to pieces."
wolf192

He is also compared to a

as Socrates refers to an old Greek proverb which

had it that if a wolf sees you first, you go dumb.

These

bestial references are to the uncivilized conduct and
beliefs of Thracymacus and bring the element of strength
forward at an early stage.

After some initial banter about

his not wanting to follow Socrates' procedures, Thracymacus
is pressed to give his definition of justice.
said he.

"Listen then,

I say that the just is nothing else than the

advantage of the

s t r o n g e r .

"193

Several points are

noteworthy about Thracymacus' statement.

First, his "listen

then" has a ring of "now here this," i.e., of a pronoun
cement from the Oracle at Delphi.

Secondly, his statement

that justice is "nothing else" than the stronger's interest
is of the same oracular nature.

This is further borne out

by Thracymacus' entire manner throughout the course of the
dialogue.
At 339a Socrates states he does not know whether
Thracymacus is right, but will attempt to find out.
Cleitophon

uses the words "bear witness."

At 340a

This switch to

legal language is suggestive of a trial motif and could be a
reference to Socrates' trial.

Grube puts the dramatic
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setting of the dialogue at 411 B.C.

This places the dialo

gue in the closing years of the war with Sparta, which
Athens was losing and likely ultimately to lose.

It was a

time of turmoil and decline, the war would soon be over (in
405 B.C.) and the Thirty Tyrants installed.

The dialogue

takes place in Piraeus, a port city of Athens and a center
of resistance to tyranny.

Polemarchus was put to death by

the Thirty Tyrants and Socrates was implicated in their
actions and later put to death by the restored democracy.
These details help focus what is at issue in the Republic,
viz., what justice really is, in the face of real tyranny.
Two of the participants in the theoretical discussion will
be put to death by this tyranny.

Plato is giving

Thracymacus' argument its due force.

Indeed, the best proof

that Thracymacus is right, is that Socrates is put to death.
If justice is the interest of the stronger, then government
is always an instrument of someone, i.e., the people in
power.

Of course, legislation does get passed this way,

bills get through Houses of Congress because of power, etc.
Although Thracymacus' definition is true, as evidenced by
the prosecution and death of Socrates, it is also false,
Plato shows, because of these very barbarous acts.
Thracymacus speaks for an entire epoch of Athenian
history.

As was clearly manifested by Cleon, Pericles, the
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Thirty Tyrants and the restored democracy, there is no real
justice.

Justice and power both change.

There was no

belief in an external standard by which to judge truth.
This extreme form of moral relativism, the belief that there
are no real values and no distinction among values, is a
form of nihilism.

For if all values are merely subjective,

i.e., merely the opinions of individuals, then every opinion
is "true."

However, if every opinion is true, then distinc

tions are no longer possible.

Truth and falsity have no

more meaning and all values are equally true and equally
false.

This is nihilism, pure and simple.

Thracymacus is thus seen to be a pure empiricist.

The

only real things are facts, what people actually do, and one
is never justified by an appeal to the ideal, i.e., in
Unger's sense, a disinterested principle, policy or purpose.
Plato, however, shows the inherent flaw in refusing to
acknowledge the ideal.

Thracymacus says the best city is

the most completely unjust

c i t y .

194

He moves, that is, from

a statement on general practice to a generalization about
human nature.

This is using human nature as a ground of

inference for a moral claim, i.e., of letting what
case determine what ought to be the case.

the

Socrates' pur

pose, in the remaining nine books of the Republic, is to
show that practice is not a good indicator of either truth
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or justice.

The critical move Thracymacus makes is the

movement from general practice (what is) to what is natural
(what ought to be).

Socrates sees this "naturalistic" argu

ment as false and dangerous.
Though it is the enterprise of Books Two through Ten of
the Republic to show how the is/ought fit together, i.e.,
how the ideal can incorporate the actual, some general
observations can be made regarding the danger, as Plato per
ceived it, with Thracymacus' position.

The inherent danger

is that nihilism or moral scepticism can be and has turned
into a thoughtless absolutism under the right circumstances.
Justice _is the advantage of the stronger, the argument goes,
and this ought to be the case.

Thus, description is turned

into prescription and the actual is elevated to the status
of the ideal.
Black's theory of judicial decision-making is thus
shown to be problematical.

If literalism is rejected (as it

is by practically every jurist but Justice Black), the only
alternative he allows is subjectivism.
lism for the reasons outlined above.

This leads to nihi
The result is that

Black's position essentially maintains;

"I have the truth,

even if not acknowledged by any other legal theorist."
position must be rejected as both literalism and subjec
tivism lead to unacceptable consequences.
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The liberal approach to judicial decision making argued
for here avoids these old and well recognized problems of
subjectivism and nihilism.

It does so by fidelity to prin

ciple of the use of testimony and appeal.

Absolutism is

avoided by asserting certain principled positions with a
foundation in testimony and appeal.

The liberal conception

advanced here acknowledges the importance of the ideal.

As

such, it is not an instrumental view of legal interpreta
tion.

There are real values in the world and these need to

be argued for and sustained through use of the best possible
political justification, all things considered.

These

values have different weight, which must again be argued for
in a principled way.

Truth and the right result, therefore,

take on a role of vital importance.

There is something of

great significance at stake in reaching a proper decision.
Since the instrumental view of law is rejected, justice is
not merely what the people who make the decisions, i.e., the
people in power, decide.
of the stronger.
in raw power.

Justice is more than the interests

Justice involves a search, not an exercise

It is evident, therefore, that this thesis'

position avoids the problem of absolutism/nihilism.

In so

doing, it is shown to be logically consistent, thus avoiding
the problems with Thracymacus' position.
Plato showed the practical dangers of a failure to
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account for the ideal and the importance of responsibly
accounting for the ideal in a clear, principled manner.
Liberalisim*s belief in rational decision making, the appli
cation of pre-existing rules and principles to new
situations in a disciplined manner, and the importance of
individual choice and the power of reason and analysis, make
it a defensible and proper framework for judicial decision
making.

For if Plato teaches us two lessons in the

Republic, they could be stated:

underneath every nihilist

is a possible tyrant; and exercises of raw power, in legal
guise, indicate how little justice is in justice, when
justice i_s what justice does.
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NOTES
^In dealing with both the natural law and positivist
traditions, I will try to focus on the things which united
the advocates of the various positions and not on the nuan
ces or differences within them.

This a "concession to the

shortness of life," as Justice Holmes would say, as the
multiplicity and variety of thought in these rich traditions
is impossible to examine adequately within the scope of this
thesis.
2381 U.S. 479 (1965).
3217 N.Y. 382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
^Richards, Rules, Policies and Neutral Principles;
Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional
Adjudication, 11 Ga, L. Rev. 1069 (1977).
5a . d'Entreves, Natural Law, An Historical Survey
(1965) at 80.
6st. Thomas Aquinas, "Question 91," Treatise on Law
(Summa Theologica, Questions 90-97), at 12-13.
7ld. at 15.
8ld.
9ld.
lOld.
11 a . d'Entreves at 84.
12 t . Aquinas at 18.
89
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90
13ld. at 75.
14ld. at 78.
. at 88.
16id.
17ld.
18id. at 92.
19ld.
20ld.
21ld. at 96.
22id. at 97.
23id.
24ld.
25a . d'Entreves at 94.
26id. at 91.
27Hartf Positivism and the Separation of Law and
Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958).
28id. at 595.
29ld. at 596.
30ld. at 597-98.
3lNote that it is Blackstone's conception of natural
law which is thus open to the positivist attack and not
Thomas' position.

The mere fact of a law, for Thomas, is

not justification for that law's existence, nor can the
authority of law be questioned just because of personal
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disagreement with that law.

Thomas thus avoids the danger

of both anarchy and conservatism by his clearly
distinguishing human law and justice or morality.
^^Hart at 618.
33ld. at 618.
34id. at 619.
35id. at 62036id. at 624-25.
37ld. at 626.
38id.
39Richards, R u l e s , P o l i c i e s , and Neutral Principles;
The Search for Legitimacy in Common Law and Constitutional
A d j u d i c a t i o n / 11 Ga. L. Rev.

1069

(1977).

4 0 ld. at 1112.
41ld.
42id.
43id. at 1113.
44RichardS/ The Moral Criticism of L a w , (1977).
4 5 id. at 33.
46Richards seems to view Ronald Dworkin's position in
Taking Rights Seriously as crossing over a line into a
natural law position which Richards does not want to follow.
4 7 id. at 35.
4 8 id. at 33.
49id. at 59.
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50ld. at 71.
51r . Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (1977).
52ld. at 339.
53ld.
54ld.
55Id. at 65.
56id. at 68.
57id. at 340.
58ld. at 341.
59id.
60ld. at 342.
61ld.
62id. at 343 (emphasis added).
83Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. 165
(1982) .
64id. at 165.
65id. at 166.
66id. at 167.
67ld. at 168.
S^Dworkin's analysis is a fleshing out of the position
he advocates against Richards on p. 342 of Taking Rights
Seriously.

There he speaks of the "threshold adequacy of

fit" and choosing the morally soundest justification from
those that meet the fit.
69[)workin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. at

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

93
168.
70ld. at 169.
"71ld.
72id. at 17 3.
73%d.
74id. at 175.
75ld. at 180.
76id. at 182.
77ld. at 186-87.
78id. at 187.
79jd.
80id.
S^Matthew 19:22, King James Version.
S^Note that this brings out the main problem with John
Hart Ely's rejection of natural law in Democracy and
Distrust.

Ely discards natural law, saying that it is too

vague and can be used to support any cause.

He argues that

if it is made more specific it is objectionable and not
widely accepted.

He concludes that we can reason about

ethical issues, but because this is not the same thing as
discovering "absolute ethical truth," "we’re where we were."
(Democracy and Distrust, p. 54).

It is not true, however,

that the result of ethical discourse is to end up where one
started.

This will be the case if one views absolutes as
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the only form of moral proposition natural law can find
acceptable.

This, however, is not the case with Dworkin's

position or with the example of testimony and appeal
outlined here.
®^S. Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript
(1941) at 295.
®^Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34 Fla. L. Rev. at
187.
^^Griswold, 381 U.S. at 482.
86id. at 484.
87Id. at 485.
88id. at 486.
89jd. at 485.
90ld. at 406.
91291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934).
92Griswold, 381 U.S. at 487.
93id. at 488-89.
94jd. at 490.
95id. at 492-93, 520.
96id. at 493.
97id. at 493, 529.
98id. at 493.
99id.
lOOjd.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

95
101 Id. at 493, 494.

lOZld.at 511, 512
103ld. at 494.
104277 U.S. 438, 478 (19

).

lOScriswold, 381 U.S. at 494.
106262 U.S. 390 (1923).
107268 U.S. 510 (1925).
IO 8 3 2 1 U.S. 158 (1944 ).
lOSgriswold, 381 U.S. at 495.
llOld.
lllld.
112id. at 496.
113id.
114id. at 497.
115371

U.S. 415, 438 (1962).

ll^Griswold, 381 U.S. at 498.
117id. at 499.
llBid. at 500.
119ld.
120id.
IZlid. at 501.
122id.

123id.
124id.
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125id. at 502.
White also concurs in the judgment in a separate
opinion.

His opinion, however, generally holds that there

has been no showing that the Connecticut ban on the use of
contraceptives by married persons affects illicit sexual
relationships.

He would hold the statutes unconstitutional

because they are too broad and deprive persons of liberty
without due process
127id. at 507.
128id. at 510.
129id. at 511.

131id.
132id. at 512.
133id. at 513.
134id. at 515.
135id. at 513
136id. at 514.
137id. at 519138id. at 525139id. at 526140id. at 527.
141id.
142id. at 530.
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143ld. at 531.
l^^Martin Heidegger, "Poetically Man Dwells," in A.
Hofstadter, Poetry, Language, Thought (tr. 1971).
145ld., M. Heidegger, "Language."
, M. Heidegger, "Poetically Man Dwells," at 216
147Griswold, 381 U.S. at 519,
148w. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts (1964).
149id, at 26.

ISOld.
3-51c. Morris, Morris on Torts (1980).
I52id, at 7.

153ld. at 17.
lS4id, at 8

IS^MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 385.
15610 M & W 109, 152 Eng. Rep. 402 (1842).
157w. Prosser, supra note 148, at 659.
1586 N.Y. 397 (1852).
159MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 386.
16089 N.Y. 470 (1882).
161x95 N.Y. 478, 88 N.E. 1063 (1909).
162MacPherson, 217 N.Y. at 387.
163id.
164id.
165id. at 389.
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166id. at 390.
167id,
168id.

at 391.

169id. at 393-94.
170ld. at 396.
l'aisée, e.g. , J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (1971) and
R. Dworkin, "Liberalism" in Public and Private Morality
(1978) .
172Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29
U.C.L.A.L. Rev. 865 (1982).
173id.
174R. Dworkin, "Neutrality, Equality, and Liberalism,"
Liberalism Reconsidered (1983) at 3.
175m . Sagoff, "Liberalism and Law," Liberalism
Reconsidered (1983) at 12.
176gee, e.g., D. Kairys, ed.. The Politics of Law;

A

Progressive Critique (1982); Trubek, Complexity and
Contradiction in the Legal Order;

Balbus and the Challenge

of Critical Social Thought About Law, 11 L. and Soc. Rev.
527 (1977) and Gross, Theory of Judicial Reasoning:

Toward

a Reconstruction, 66 Ky. L.J. 801 (1977-78).
177unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv.
L. Rev. 561, 564 (1983).
178id.
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179id.
IBOid. at 565.
183-Id.

182id.
183id.
184id. at 566.
185i^

186id.
187id.
188id.
189id. at 567.
190see text supra pp. 54-56.
191plato, The Republic, translated by G.M.A. Grube
(1974).
192ld. at 336d.
193id. at 338c.
194id. at 351b.
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